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ABSTRACT
Resilient Monitoring and Control Systems: Design, Analysis, and Performance Evaluation
by
Maruthi T Ravichandran
Chair: Professor Semyon M. Meerkov
Critical infrastructure systems (i.e., power plants, power grids, transportation networks,
chemical plants, etc.) and their sensor networks are vulnerable to cyber-physical attacks.
Cyber attacks refer to the malicious manipulation of the sensor data, while physical attacks
refer to the intentional damage of the plant components, by an adversary. The goal of this
dissertation is to develop monitoring and control systems that are resilient to these attacks.
The monitoring system is termed resilient if it provides the least uncertain (in terms
of the minimum entropy) process variable estimates and plant condition assessment. Sim-
ilarly, the feedback control system is termed resilient if it identifies the actuators under
attack and generates the best possible control signals (in terms of the largest probability of
maintaining the process variables in the desired range).
The resilient monitoring system (RMS) developed in this research consists of five lay-
ers: Data quality acquisition, process variable assessment, plant condition assessment, sen-
sor network adaptation, and decentralized knowledge fusion. The techniques involved in
each of these layers are rigorously analyzed and are shown to identify the plant condition
- normal or anomalous - in a reliable and timely manner. The developed RMS is applied
to a model of a power plant, and its performance is evaluated under several cyber-physical
x
attack scenarios. The measure of resiliency is quantified using Kullback-Leibler divergence
and is shown to be high in all scenarios considered.
The resilient control system (RCS) is developed based on two approaches: Model pre-
dictive control (MPC)-based approach and synchronous detection (SD)-based approach. In
the MPC-based approach, a control input is calculated using the information provided by
the RMS. The goal here is to steer the process variable to the desired value, while ensuring
that it always remains within a safe domain. In the SD-based approach, the condition of
the sensor and actuator is assessed using the method of synchronous detection. Then, using
this assessment, the controller is modified (if possible) so that the effects of the attacks on
the closed loop system response are eliminated. Using simulations, it is shown that both
these approaches are viable for the design of RCS.
Thus, the main contribution of this research is in providing the theoretical foundation
for the design of resilient monitoring and control systems applicable to a class of critical
infrastructure systems, characterized by complex interactions of continuous process vari-
ables.
xi
CHAPTER I
Introduction
Resilient monitoring and control systems is a relatively new area of research. In this sec-
tion, we briefly characterize these systems and describe the goals of our investigations. In
addition, the organization of this dissertation is outlined at the end of this section.
1.1 Resilient Monitoring Systems
Plant monitoring systems are wired or wireless sensor networks intended to measure pro-
cess variables (e.g., temperature, pressure, flow rates, etc.), analyze them, and inform the
plant operator about the plant conditions − normal or anomalous. Based on this infor-
mation, the operator or the automatic control system takes corrective actions, if needed.
When some of the sensors are captured by an attacker, forcing them to project mislead-
ing information (possibly, statistically unrelated to the actual values of process variables),
the identified plant conditions could be erroneous. This may lead to wrong actions on the
part of the operator/control system and, possibly, a disaster. To prevent this situation, the
monitoring system must possess a capability of autonomously identifying the attacked sen-
sors and mitigating their effect (by discounting or disregarding completely the data they
project). Although the loss of sensors may lead to degradation of plant condition assess-
ment, in a well-designed system this degradation should be “proportional” to the severity of
the attack, i.e., graceful. Plant monitoring systems that possess such a property are referred
1
to as resilient.
This research is intended to develop techniques that can be used to ensure resiliency,
analyze their properties and, on this basis, design and evaluate the performance of a re-
silient monitoring system. A specific application, in terms of which the development is
carried out, is a simplified model of a power plant, although a similar approach can be used
for other applications as well.
While the designed resilient monitoring system exhibits a high level of resiliency, it
exposed a shortcoming of the approach developed− the time required to compute the plant
condition assessment increases exponentially with the number of sensors in the sensor net-
work. (This problem was termed by Richard Bellman as the curse of dimensionality.)
Clearly, the above shortcoming may result in an unacceptably long assessment time in
many applications, and, thus, its reduction is a central problem of improving the resilient
monitoring system design. This problem is addressed in the dissertation.
1.2 Resilient Control Systems
Resilient control systems are feedback systems that maintain an acceptable level of per-
formance in the presence of attacks on the plant, sensors, and actuators. This research
addresses the design of resilient control systems based on two approaches, described be-
low.
The first approach involves the calculation of the resilient control input, using the infor-
mation provided by the resilient monitoring system. As described in details in a subsequent
chapter of the dissertation, this approach is similar to that of model predictive control [1].
In the second approach, the condition of the sensors and actuators are first assessed us-
ing the method of synchronous detection [2]. Then, based on this assessment, the controller
is modified (if possible) so that the effects of the attacks on the closed loop system response
are eliminated.
2
1.3 Organization of Dissertation
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: The design, analysis, and perfor-
mance evaluation of the resilient monitoring system is described in Chapter II. The issue
of combating the curse of dimensionality is addressed in Chapter III. The model predictive
control approach to resilient feedback systems is presented in Chapter IV. The synchronous
detection approach to resilient control systems is described in Chapter V. Finally, the con-
clusions and directions for future research are given in Chapter VI. All proofs and the
parameters involved in simulating the power plant are included in the Appendices.
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CHAPTER II
Resilient Monitoring Systems: Architecture, Design,
Analysis, and Performance Evaluation
2.1 Introduction
This section describes the specific scenario addressed in resilient monitoring systems, and
outlines the techniques developed in this work.
2.1.1 Scenario and problem addressed
Briefly, the scenario considered in this research is as follows:
• The monitored plant process variables, Vi, i = 1, ...,M , are characterized by prob-
ability density functions (pdf’s) fV˜i(v˜i), i = 1, ...,M . In practice, the status of the
process variables is often characterized as being Normal (N) or Anomalous (A). The
latter could be, for instance, Low (L) or High (H). In this case, fV˜i(v˜i) induces a ran-
dom event with the outcomes in {LVi,NVi ,HVi}, i = 1, ...,M . With a slight abuse of
terminology, we refer to this event (and similar events throughout this dissertation) as
a discrete random variable, Vi, i = 1, ...M , with the probability mass function (pmf),
p[Vi], defined on the universal set ΣVi = {LVi ,NVi,HVi}, i = 1, ...,M .
• The plant, G, is also characterized by its status, which is a discrete random variable,
G, with the pmf p[G] defined by the pmf’s of process variables and taking values on
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ΣG = {NG,AG}, where NG and AG denote the normal and anomalous plant statuses,
respectively. Depending on the plant, the anomalous status can be further character-
ized by specific anomalies, e.g., boiler insulation damaged, turbine malfunctioning,
etc. In each status, plant dynamics may be different, e.g., described by different
transfer functions.
• Each process variable, Vi, is monitored by a sensor, Si (multiple sensors of a process
variable are also considered in the sequel). If a sensor is under attack, its projected
data may have a pdf, fS˜i(s˜i), statistically unrelated to fV˜i(v˜i). In this situation, uti-
lizing the sensor data in order to assess the process variable may lead to a pmf, pˆ[Vi],
qualitatively different from p[Vi]. For instance, pˆ[Vi] may indicate that the process
variable is Normal, while in reality it is Low or High.
• The plant status assessment is based on the process variable assessments, pˆ[Vi], i =
1, ...,M , and is quantified by a pmf denoted as pˆ[G], G ∈ {NG,AG}. Since, as
indicated above, the process variable assessments may be erroneous, pˆ[G] may be
quite different from the actual p[G] and, thus, lead to erroneous actions by the plant
operator.
In this scenario, the optimal resilient monitoring system must be able to identify the
status of the plant, G, in such a manner that the “distance” between the estimated and
the actual pmf’s, pˆ[G] and p[G], is minimized, as quantified by an appropriate measure of
distance between the two pmf’s. While this research is not intended to solve this problem,
here we design a plant monitoring system that degrades gracefully under an attack (i.e.,
is resilient), and demonstrate that it performs favorably in comparison with a non-resilient
one (as quantified by a measure of resiliency based on the Kullback-Leibler divergence [3]).
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2.1.2 Contributions of this work: Techniques developed and resilient monitoring
system designed
The techniques developed in this work are as follows:
• The “trustworthiness” of a sensor is quantified by a parameter referred to as data
quality (DQ), which takes values on [0, 1], with 1 indicating that the sensor is totally
trustworthy and 0 not trustworthy at all. To identify DQ, we develop an active data
quality acquisition procedure, whereby probing signals are applied to process vari-
ables, and the level of disagreement between the anticipated and the actual response
of the sensors is used to quantify their DQ’s.
• The estimates of process variables pmf’s, pˆ[Vi], i = 1, ...,M , are calculated based
on the data projected by the sensors and their DQ’s. Since DQ is not a statistical
quantity, classical statistics cannot be used for this purpose. Therefore, we introduce
a model of the DQ’s effect on the coupling between sensors data and process vari-
ables and, using this model, develop the so-called h-procedure (which is a modified
stochastic approximation algorithm [4]). Analyzing this procedure, we show that it
converges to a steady state defined by the DQ’s. Specifically, if DQ = 1, it con-
verges to the actual process variable pmf; as DQ tends to 0, the steady state of the
h-procedure converges to a uniform pmf, implying that in this limit the sensor mea-
surements carry no information at all. For all other DQ’s, the conditional pmf of Vi
given the sensor data is an affine function of DQ. When multiple sensors monitor a
process variable, the Dempster-Shafer rule [5] is used to combine the steady states
of the h-procedures associated with each sensor.
• The estimate of the plant status pmf, pˆ[G], is calculated based on the statistical plant
model (typically given as a set of conditional pmf’s P [Vi|G], i = 1, ...,M , or a joint
conditional pmf P [V1, V2, ..., VM |G]), the estimates of the process variables pmf’s,
pˆ[Vi], i = 1, ...,M , and the Jeffrey rule [6].
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• The above assessments are carried out at each state of the sensor network, where
the state is a vector of 1’s and 0’s, with 1 indicating that the corresponding sensor is
taken into account for process variable assessment and 0 that it is not. The quality of
each state is quantified by the entropy (i.e., the level of uncertainty) of either pˆ[G] or
pˆ[Vi]. The adaptation of the sensor network to the optimal state, i.e., the state with
the smallest entropy, is carried out using the so-called rational controllers [7], which
are decision making devices that reside mostly in states, where the penalty function
(i.e., entropy) is minimized.
• As mentioned above, the adaptation can be carried out using the entropy of either
pˆ[G] or pˆ[Vi]. The former, which we refer to as centralized, suffers from the curse of
dimensionality: the adaptation time grows exponentially with the number of sensors
in the network. To combat this problem, a decentralized system (see, e.g., [8–12]),
with adaptation based on pˆ[Vi], could be used. In the case of a power plant, this
decentralized system is comprised of sub-plants, e.g., boiler, turbine, reheat pipe,
etc. Such a decomposition, however, impedes the derivation of inferences among the
sub-plants, which, as it turns out, are important to ensure resiliency. Therefore, we
develop a decentralized system based on plant decomposition with knowledge fusion
and show that it leads to both mitigation of the curse of dimensionality and derivation
of the previously mentioned inferences.
The above techniques were introduced in our previous work, [13–19]. Using these
techniques, we design a resilient plant monitoring system consisting of the following five
layers: data quality acquisition, process variable assessment, adaptation, knowledge fu-
sion, and sub-plant assessment. The subsequent sections describe in details each of the
developed techniques, along with its application to the power plant monitoring system.
7
2.1.3 Related literature
The literature related to the topic of this chapter can be classified into six groups. The
first one is devoted to foundational issues, where the problems of resilient monitoring and
control are motivated and formulated, [20–25]. The second group includes publications on
control-theoretic methods for attack identification and alleviation, [26–31]. In these publi-
cations, the authors consider LTI systems with a given state space realization (A,B,C,D)
and disturbances interpreted as attack vectors. The problem addressed is to identify the
attack and, if possible, mitigate its effect, for instance, by designing a controller that makes
the closed-loop system invariant with respect to the disturbance attack. The main difference
of the current work is that the plant may be either normal or anomalous (i.e., described by
several state space realizations), and the problem is to identify the true plant status, in spite
of the misleading information projected by the sensors.
The third group consists of publications on fault tolerant control, [32–34]. In these
works, it is assumed that a closed-loop system has multiple sensors and actuators, some
of which could be faulty due to natural or malicious causes. The typical problem here is
to determine the conditions (e.g., the number of sensors and actuators) under which the
closed-loop system performance is maintained without degradation. The difference of the
current work is that, although multiple sensors may be present, the goal is to determine the
status of the plant and, if otherwise impossible, tolerate degradation.
The fourth group consists of research on monitoring the communication channels or the
sensor measurements in order to capture anomalous data and correlate it with a possible at-
tack, [35–40]. In terms of the current work, this implies the identification of DQ. While
the results of these publications may be useful for resilient plant monitoring, they do not
provide methods for process variable and plant condition assessment pursued in the current
work.
The fifth group consists of papers on identification of and protection against data in-
jection attacks intended to mislead state estimation algorithms, [41–47]. The emphasis of
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the research here is on determining optimal positions of “known-secure” sensors, which
prevent the damage of the attack, or on utilizing game-theoretic approaches as quantitative
techniques for risk management.
The sixth group consists of publications on the analysis of vulnerability of the cyber-
physical system to attacks, [48–50]. In these papers, tools such as graph theory and dis-
crete event systems theory are utilized to determine “vulnerability points” in the system.
However, these works do not provide methods to identify the plant condition under the
misleading information projected by the sensors.
Although the areas of robust estimation and robust statistics (see, e.g., [51]) may seem
related to the topic of this dissertation, they are, in reality, not, since the data provided by
the attacked sensors could be statistically unrelated to the process variable.
To summarize, the current literature does not offer any methods of identifying the plant
status under misleading information provided by the sensors. The methods to accomplish
that are developed in this dissertation.
2.1.4 Chapter outline
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 addresses the issue of ac-
tive data quality acquisition. In Section 2.3, the h-procedure and associated techniques for
process variable assessment are described. Section 2.4 is devoted to plant pmf assessment.
The sensor network adaptation is discussed in Section 2.5, where a practical consequence
of the curse of dimensionality is quantified. An approach to combatting the curse of dimen-
sionality based on a decentralized system with knowledge fusion is developed in Section
2.6. The resulting five-layer monitoring system architecture is presented in Section 2.7. An
application to a power plant is discussed and investigated by simulations in Section 2.8. All
proofs and the parameters of the power plant model are included in the Appendix.
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2.2 Active Data Quality Acquisition
In this section, we describe an approach to DQ evaluation briefly mentioned in Subsection
2.1.2.
Consider sensor S intended to monitor process variable V and assume that the follow-
ing holds:
Assumption II.1. (i) Process variable V is quantified by a continuous random variable
V˜ , taking values in the domain V˜ ∈ [Vmin, Vmax]; its pdf, fV˜ (v˜), is unknown.
(ii) The random variable V˜ induces a discrete random variable V , which describes the
status of V and takes values on
ΣV = {LV ,NV ,HV } (2.1)
with the pmf given by
p[V = LV ] =
∫ R1
Vmin
fV˜ (v˜) dv˜, p[V = NV ] =
∫ R2
R1
fV˜ (v˜) dv˜,
p[V = HV ] =
∫ Vmax
R2
fV˜ (v˜) dv˜,
(2.2)
where R1 and R2 are known and Vmin < R1 < R2 < Vmax (V ’s with outcomes other
than Low, Normal, and High can be introduced similarly). Since fV˜ (v˜) is unknown,
the pmf of V is also unknown.
(iii) The d.c. gain, αV, of V with respect to its control input, UV (e.g., fuel valve of the
boiler), depends on the status of V, i.e., whether it is Low, Normal, or High. This is
formalized by assuming that αV is a priori known piecewise constant function of the
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expected value of V˜ (denoted as µV˜ ):
αV =


αLV, if µV˜ ∈ [Vmin, R1)
αNV, if µV˜ ∈ [R1, R2)
αHV, if µV˜ ∈ [R2, Vmax].
(2.3)
In the case of other than L, N, and H anomalies, αV is introduced similarly. (Note
that we use here the d.c. gain, rather than the full transfer function, in order to require
as little information about the plant as possible. Also, various other dependencies of
αV on µV˜ can be considered; for instance, αV could be assumed to be a piecewise
linear function of µV˜ ; expression (2.3) is used here for simplicity.)
(iv) The data projected by sensor S is quantified by a continuous random variable S˜,
taking values on S˜ ∈ [Vmin, Vmax]; its pdf, fS˜(s˜), can be evaluated using the classical
statistical methods (based on the sensor measurements).
(v) The random variable S˜ induces a discrete random variable S taking values on
ΣS = ΣV = {LV ,NV ,HV } (2.4)
with the pmf given by
p[S = LV ] =
∫ R1
Vmin
fS˜(s˜) ds˜, p[S = NV ] =
∫ R2
R1
fS˜(s˜) ds˜,
p[S = HV ] =
∫ Vmax
R2
fS˜(s˜) ds˜,
(2.5)
where R1 and R2 are the same as in (2.2). Since fS˜(s˜) may be viewed as known, the
pmf of S is known as well.
(vi) If S is not attacked, µS˜ = µV˜ , where µS˜ is the expected value of S˜. If S is under
attack, µS˜ 6= µV˜ and the pmf’s of S and V may be qualitatively different; for instance,
11
max
σ∈ΣS
p[S = σ] may be achieved at σ = LV , while max
σ∈ΣV
p[V = σ] at σ = NV . (The
expression µS˜ 6= µV˜ can be viewed as a definition of the attacker; other types of
attackers can be considered as well.)

Under Assumption II.1, the active data quality acquisition is carried out as follows:
Introduce a probing signal using the control input UV. Any type of deterministic or random
probing signals could be used. Here, we use the simplest probe − a rectangular pulse with
amplitude AV and duration T , applied at the time instant t0, i.e.,
uV(t) = AVrectT (t− t0). (2.6)
The value of AV is selected sufficiently small so that AV << min{[R1 − Vmin], [R2 −
R1], [Vmax−R2]}. The value of T is selected so that V˜ reaches a small vicinity of its steady
state defined by the probe.
If the sensor is not under attack, i.e., µS˜ = µV˜ , the following takes place:
µ′
S˜
− µS˜ = AVαV(µS˜), (2.7)
where µ′
S˜
is the expected value of S˜ after the probe and αV is the d.c. gain defined in (2.3).
If the sensor is attacked, (2.7) does not hold. In order to quantify the severity of the attack,
introduce the notion of probing inconsistency (PICS) defined by:
PICS :=
∣∣(µ′
S˜
− µS˜)− AVαV (µS˜)
∣∣ . (2.8)
Clearly PICS = 0 implies that the sensor is not attacked; PICS > 0 indicates an attack
and its severity. Given this PICS, the DQ of sensor S is defined as:
DQS = e
−F (PICS), (2.9)
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where F (·) is a strictly increasing function of PICS with F (0) = 0. Note that if F (PICS)
grows too fast, then DQ will be small even for relatively small PICS’s; if it grows too
slow, DQ is relatively large even for large PICS’s. Our numerical study, reported in [14],
indicates that a quadratic F (·) provides better results for subsequent utilization than a linear
one. Therefore, we introduce this function as
F (PICS) := − ln ǫ
P IC2max,S
PIC2S, (2.10)
where ǫ is a sufficiently small positive number and PICmax,S is the largest value attainable
by PICS. Clearly, due to (2.9) and (2.10), minDQS = ǫ, which can be viewed as a design
parameter.
Expressions (2.1)-(2.10) characterize the active DQ acquisition procedure utilized in
this work. As mentioned above, numerous modifications of this procedure are possible by
considering different properties of V , different types of probing signals and their effect on
process variables, various definitions of probing inconsistency, etc. Specific selections may
depend on intended applications. The ones used here are motivated by the application to a
power plant.
2.3 Process Variable pmf Assessment
In this section, we describe an approach to the evaluation of process variable pmf, pˆ[V ].
As mentioned in Subsection 2.1.2, this pmf is evaluated based on the sensors data and their
DQ’s. If the DQ were 1, this could be accomplished using classical statistics. However,
these methods would lead to erroneous results if 0 ≤ DQ < 1. Therefore, to carry out
this evaluation, a model of the effect of DQ on the coupling between V and S must be
postulated and then, in the framework of this model, a novel statistical method for pmf’s
evaluation should be developed. Below, this development is carried out, and methods for
pmf evaluation using a single and multiple sensors are introduced.
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2.3.1 Model of V and S coupling
We introduce the notion of sensor believability as follows:
βS =
|ΣV | − 1
|ΣV | DQS +
1
|ΣV | , (2.11)
where |ΣV | is the cardinality of the universal set of V . If, as indicated in (2.1), |ΣV | = 3,
then
βS =
2
3
DQS +
1
3
.
The last two equations imply that when DQ = 1, believability is also 1; when DQ = 0, be-
lievability is 1
|ΣV |
, implying that every status of V is equally likely. Using the believability,
introduce
Assumption II.2. The coupling between V and S is as follows:
P [V = σ|S = σ] = βS,
P [V = σ¯|S = σ] = 1−βS
|ΣV |−1
,
(2.12)
where σ¯ implies ‘not σ’ and σ, σ¯ ∈ ΣV . 
Clearly, this implies that if DQ = 1, then V has the same status as S with probability
1; if DQ = 0, every status of V is equally probable, irrespective of the status of S. The
coupling (2.12) is used throughout this work.
2.3.2 Process variable pmf assessment using a single sensor
Consider a sensor S intended to monitor process variable V. As indicated above, our goal
is to evaluate the pmf of V , based on the sensor data, s1, s2, ..., sn, ... (where the subscript
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is the time index) and its data quality DQS. In other words, we are interested in
pˆ[V = σ] = lim
n→∞
P [V = σ|s1, s2, ..., sn;DQS], ∀σ ∈ ΣV . (2.13)
To accomplish this, consider
pˆn[V = σ] = P [V = σ|s1, s2, ..., sn;DQS], ∀σ ∈ ΣV , (2.14)
and introduce, for convenience, the notation
hσ(n) := pˆn[V = σ], ∀σ ∈ ΣV .
Obviously, the limit of hσ(n), ∀σ ∈ ΣV , as n → ∞ (if it exists) is the sought pmf, pˆ[V ].
Define the evolution of hσ(n) as follows:
hσ(n+ 1) = hσ(n) + ǫh [h
∗
σ(sn+1)− hσ(n)] , hσ(0) =
1
|ΣV | , ∀σ ∈ ΣV , (2.15)
where the set point, h∗σ(sn+1), is given by
h∗σ(sn+1) =


βS, if sn+1 = σ
1−βS
|ΣV |−1
, if sn+1 6= σ,
(2.16)
and the step, ǫh, is either a small number,
0 < ǫh << 1, (2.17)
or a function of n, monotonically converging to 0 such that
0 < ǫh(n) ≤ 1,
∞∑
n=0
ǫh(n) =∞,
∞∑
n=0
ǫ2h(n) <∞. (2.18)
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As it follows from (2.16), the evolution of hσ(n) depends on both the sensor data and
DQS (through βS). The system of equations (2.15), (2.16) is referred to as the h-procedure.
It can be viewed as a stochastic approximation algorithm [4] with a random set point.
Theorem II.1. Under Assumptions II.1 and II.2, the recursive procedure (2.15), (2.16)
converges to
lim
n→∞
hσ(n) = p[S = σ]DQS +
1−DQS
|ΣV | , ∀σ ∈ ΣV , (2.19)
where
1. The convergence is in probability under (2.17);
2. The convergence is almost sure under (2.18).
Proof. See the Appendix. 
Equation (2.19) implies that
pˆ[V = σ] = p[S = σ]DQS +
1−DQS
|ΣV | , ∀σ ∈ ΣV . (2.20)
Thus, according to the above theorem, if DQ is close to 1, the pmf of process variable,
pˆ[V ], is close to the pmf of the sensor, p[S]. However, if DQ is close to 0, the same sensor
data result in pˆ[V ] being practically uniform and independent of the sensor measurements.
For all intermediate values of DQ, the pmf pˆ[V ] is an affine function of DQ.
Recursive procedure (2.15), (2.16) is the basis of process variable assessments used
throughout this work.
2.3.3 Process variable pmf assessment using multiple sensors
Assume that process variable V is monitored by two sensors, S1 and S2, having data qual-
ity, DQS1 and DQS2 , respectively. The goal is to evaluate pˆ[V ] based on the data projected
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by both sensors, i.e.,
pˆS1,S2 [V = σ] = lim
n→∞
P [V = σ|s11, ..., s1n;DQS1 ; s21, ..., s2n;DQS2], ∀σ ∈ ΣV . (2.21)
This can be accomplished by combining the two pmf’s, evaluated based on the h-procedure,
i.e., pˆS1[V ] and pˆS2 [V ], into a single pmf, pˆS1,S2 [V ], using the Dempster-Shafer rule [5]:
pˆS1,S2 [V = σ] =
pˆS1 [V = σ]pˆS2 [V = σ]∑
σ∈ΣV
pˆS1 [V = σ]pˆS2 [V = σ]
, ∀σ ∈ ΣV . (2.22)
A question arises: Is pˆS1,S2[V ] “better” than the constituent pˆS1 [V ] and pˆS2[V ] from
the point of view of the uncertainty in the process variable assessment, i.e., entropy? Cal-
culations show that this may or may not be the case (depending on DQS1 and DQS2).
Therefore, having the three estimates pˆS1 [V ], pˆS2 [V ], and pˆS1,S2[V ], we select as the final
estimate, pˆ∗[V ], the one with the smallest entropy, i.e.,
pˆ∗[V ] = argmin
[
I{pˆS1 [V ]}, I{pˆS2[V ]}, I{pˆS1,S2 [V ]}] , (2.23)
where the entropy is the Shannon entropy [52], defined as
I{p[V ]} = −
∑
σ∈ΣV
p[V = σ] log|ΣV | p[V = σ]. (2.24)
2.4 Plant pmf Assessment
As mentioned in Subsection 2.1.2, the plant status assessment is quantified by pˆ[G], G ∈
ΣG. To describe a method for its evaluation, let the plant model be given by P [Vi|G],
i = 1, ...,M , and let pˆ[Vi], i = 1, ...,M , denote the process variable pmf’s evaluated as
described in Section 2.3. Then, pˆ[G] can be computed using the following:
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Algorithm II.1. (a) Assign the initial plant pmf:
p0[G] =
[
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
]
. (2.25)
(b) Calculate the initial joint pmf of Vi and G:
p0[Vi, G] = P [Vi|G]p0[G], i = 1, 2, ...,M. (2.26)
(c) Calculate the marginal probability:
p0[Vi] =
∑
G∈ΣG
p0[Vi, G], i = 1, 2, ...,M. (2.27)
(d) Apply the Jeffrey rule [6]:
pˆ[Vi, G] = p0[Vi, G]
pˆ[Vi]
p0[Vi]
, i = 1, 2, ...,M. (2.28)
(e) Marginalize to obtain the plant pmf estimate:
pˆVi[G] =
∑
Vi∈ΣVi
pˆ[Vi, G], i = 1, 2, ..,M. (2.29)
(f) If M > 1, combine the pmf’s obtained in (2.29) using the Dempster-Shafer rule:
pˆ[G = σG] =
M∏
i=1
pˆVi[G = σG]
∑
σG∈ΣG
M∏
i=1
pˆVi[G = σG]
, σG ∈ ΣG. (2.30)

If the plant model is given as P [V1, V2, ..., VM |G], marginalize it to obtain P [Vi|G],
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i = 1, 2, ...,M , and then follow steps (a)-(f) above.
Algorithm II.1 is carried out after the h-procedure has converged and pˆ[Vi], i = 1, ...,M ,
is evaluated. To speed up the process of pˆ[G] evaluation, it is tempting to apply this algo-
rithm recursively, i.e., using pˆn[Vi], instead of pˆ[Vi], at step (d). As it turns out, however,
this may lead to a paradox: the entropy of pˆn[G] may tend to 0 as n → ∞, irrespective of
the sensors data and their DQ’s. This paradox can be explained by the fact that when pˆn[Vi]
approaches its limit (i.e., is practically constant), the dynamics of pˆn[G] are defined not by
the sensor measurements and their DQ’s, but by the eigenvalues of the recursive version of
Algorithm II.1, defined as follows:
Algorithm II.2. (a) Assign the plant pmf at time n as:
pˆn[G], where pˆ0[G] =
[
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
]
. (2.31)
(b) Calculate the joint pmf of Vi and G:
pˆn[Vi, G] = P [Vi|G]pˆn[G], n = 0, 1, 2, ...; i = 1, 2, ...,M. (2.32)
(c) Calculate the marginal probability:
pˆGn [Vi] =
∑
G∈ΣG
pˆn[Vi, G], n = 0, 1, 2, ...; i = 1, 2, ...,M. (2.33)
(d) Apply the Jeffrey rule:
pˆn+1[Vi, G] = pˆn[Vi, G]
pˆn+1[Vi]
pˆGn [Vi]
, n = 0, 1, 2, ...; i = 1, 2, ...,M. (2.34)
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(e) Marginalize to obtain the plant pmf estimate:
pˆVin+1[G] =
∑
Vi∈ΣVi
pˆn+1[Vi, G], n = 0, 1, 2, ...; i = 1, 2, ...,M. (2.35)
(f) If M > 1, combine the pmf’s obtained in (2.35) using the Dempster-Shafer rule:
pˆn+1[G = σG] =
M∏
i=1
pˆVin+1[G = σG]
∑
σG
M∏
i=1
pˆVin+1[G = σG]
, n = 0, 1, 2, ...; σG ∈ ΣG. (2.36)
(g) Update n to n+ 1. Return to (a).

To investigate the performance of this algorithm, consider a plant G with process vari-
able V, monitored by sensor S. Assume that the universal sets of G, V , and S are given
by:
ΣG = {NG,AG}, ΣV = ΣS = {NV ,AV }. (2.37)
Further, assume that the plant model is characterized by the conditional pmf
P [V |G] =

 1− a a
a 1− a

 , (2.38)
where a < 0.5. Denote the pmf’s of the process variable and the plant at time n as
pˆn[V ] = [hNV (n), hAV (n)], pˆn[G] = [kNG(n), kAG(n)], (2.39)
where hNV (n) and hAV (n) are calculated using the h-procedure (2.15), (2.16) and kNG(n)
and kAG(n) are evaluated using Algorithm II.2. To specify the evolution of kNG(n) and
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kAG(n), substitute (2.38) and (2.39) in steps (a)-(e) of this algorithm to obtain
kNG(n+ 1) =
[
1− a
C(n)
]
kNG(n) +
[
akNG(n)
D(n)
− [1− a]kNG(n)
C(n)
]
hNV (n + 1), (2.40)
with kNG(0) = 0.5 and C(n) and D(n) given by
C(n) := [1− a]kNG(n) + a[1− kNG(n)],
D(n) := akNG(n) + [1− a][1 − kNG(n)].
(2.41)
Denote the steady state values of hNV (n) and hAV (n), evolving according to the h-
procedure (2.15),(2.16), as hssNV and hssAV , respectively. Then, the steady state values of
kNG(n) and kAG(n) are quantified as follows:
Theorem II.2. The steady state, kssNG , of the recursion (2.40) is characterized by:
1. kssNG = 1, if hssNV > 1− a;
2. kssNG = 0, if hssNV < a;
3. kssNG =
hssNV
−a
1−2a
, if hssNV > a and hssNV < 1− a.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
This theorem exhibits the paradoxical nature of the recursive Jeffrey rule. Namely,
if, for instance, hssNV = 0.7, i.e., pˆ[V ] = [0.7, 0.3], and a = 0.4, then, according to Part
1 of Theorem II.2, pˆ[G] = [1, 0], implying that the plant status is normal with certainty,
while the process variable status is uncertain. Similarly, for the same a, if hssNV = 0.3, i.e.,
pˆ[V ] = [0.3, 0.7], then, according to Part 2, pˆ[G] = [0, 1], implying that the plant status
is anomalous, again with certainty, while the process variable status is uncertain. In other
words, this theorem implies that a recursive version of Jeffrey rule may “create erroneous
information” rather than transfer it from one quantity, Vi, into another, G.
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2.5 Sensor Network Adaptation and Measure of Resiliency
As mentioned in Subsection 2.1.2, the adaptation of sensor network to the state with mini-
mal entropy can be carried out using either the plant or the process variable pmf’s. In this
section, we describe the former and in Section 2.7 the latter.
2.5.1 Sensor network
Consider the plant G with M process variables, V1,V2, ...,VM , monitored by NS sensors,
S1,S2, ...,SNS , under Assumption II.1. Each sensor may or may not be utilized for the
process variable pmf’s assessment. This induces the sensor network state space, X , where
each state, x, is an NS-tuple of 1’s and 0’s, with 1 in the i-th place indicating that Si is
used for process variable pmf’s assessment and 0 that it is not. Thus, the cardinality of the
state space, |X|, is 2NS . (A practical consequence of this exponential growth of |X| as a
function of NS is discussed in Subsection 2.5.4.) The process variable pmf’s and the plant
pmf assessed in state x of the sensor network are denoted as pˆx[Vi], i = 1, ...,M , and pˆx[G],
x ∈ X , respectively. The goal of the sensor network adaptation is to converge to the state,
where the entropy of pˆx[G] is minimal.
2.5.2 Adaptation using a rational controller
As mentioned in Subsection 2.1.2, the adaptation technique used in this work is based on
rational controllers introduced in [7] and further developed in [53, 54]. Rational controllers
are decision making devices that possess two properties: ergodicity and rationality. The
ergodicity property implies that each state, x, of the decision space, X , is visited with a
non-zero probability. The rationality property implies that the residence time in states with
a smaller value of the penalty function is larger than in those with a larger one. The degree
to which this distinction takes place is referred to as the level of rationality and quantified
by a positive integer, N .
If the sensor network adaptation is based on the plant assessment pmf, pˆx[G], the
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penalty function is selected as its entropy, I{pˆx[G]} := Iˆx(G). Various types of ratio-
nal controller dynamics can be defined to ensure rationality and ergodicity. In this work, to
ensure the former, the following residence time in each state x ∈ X is introduced:
Tx =


Tmax, if Iˆx(G) ≤ β(
β
Iˆx(G)
)N
Tmax, if Iˆx(G) > β,
(2.42)
where β > 0 is a small number (design parameter) and Tmax is the largest residence time
(also a design parameter). To ensure ergodicity, when Tx expires, the controller moves to
the next state in a deterministic, round-robin manner.
Let τx be the relative residence time in state x ∈ X , i.e.,
τx =
Tx∑
x∈X
Tx
. (2.43)
Then, the average plant assessment pmf, to be reported to the plant operator after each
complete round-robin cycle, is evaluated as
p¯[G] =
∑
x∈X
τxpˆx[G]. (2.44)
It can be shown that if N is sufficiently large, p¯[G] is arbitrarily close to p∗[G] at which
min
x∈X
Iˆx(G) is attained (see [7]). Note that although under the deterministic, round-robin
transition rule, the state with the minimal entropy could be selected by various other meth-
ods, we use (2.42)-(2.44) since it is equally applicable to random transitions, which may
be necessary in other applications.
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2.5.3 Measure of resiliency
The measure of resiliency employed in this work is based on the Kullback-Leibler diver-
gence, [3], of two pmf’s, p1[G] and p2[G], given by:
D (p1[G]||p2[G]) =
∑
σG∈ΣG
p1 [G = σG] log|ΣG|
p1[G = σG]
p2[G = σG]
. (2.45)
Let p1[G] be the true pmf of the plant, p[G]. As for p2[G], we consider two cases. In the
first one, p2[G] is p¯[G] calculated according to (2.44) and based on the DQ’s of the sensors.
In the second, p2[G] is the pmf of the plant assessed under the assumption that the DQ of
all sensors is 1; we refer to such a system as non-resilient and denote the resulting pmf as
pnr[G]. Then, the measure of resiliency (MR) considered in this paper is given by
MR =
D (p[G]||pnr[G])−D (p[G]||p¯[G])
D (p[G]||pnr[G]) . (2.46)
Clearly, MR ≤ 1, and the equality is attained when p¯[G] = p[G]. Thus, to test the re-
siliency of a monitoring system, one has to assume that p[G] is known, evaluate p¯[G] and
pnr[G], and then use (2.46). This is carried out in Section 2.8 for the case of the power
plant.
2.5.4 Temporal properties of adaptation and curse of dimensionality
From the temporal point of view, the adaptation process consists of epochs; |X| epochs
(where, as before, X is the sensor network state space) comprise a cycle; at the end of each
cycle, p¯[G] is reported to the plant operator.
For each x ∈ X , the epoch consists of three periods: DQ acquisition (TDQ), process
variable(s) and plant pmf evaluation (Teval), and residence in state x (Tx). Assuming that
the sensor data are provided every 0.01sec and using the procedure described in Section 2.2,
TDQ can be evaluated as 5sec (if the time constant of the process variable is 1sec and 100
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measurements are utilized to calculate the sensor mean). Using the procedures described
in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, the duration of process variable and plant assessment, Teval, can be
calculated as 6sec (if the stopping rule of the h-procedure is |hσ(n+ 1)− hσ(n)| < 10−4).
The maximum residence period, Tmax, can be selected as desired. If it is selected to be
1sec, the duration of each epoch is less than or equal to 12sec.
As mentioned above, |X| epochs constitute a cycle, so that the cycle duration is, at
most, 12|X|sec. Thus, the resilient monitoring system provides the plant assessment pmf,
p¯[G], within a reporting period Treport = 12|X|sec. If a network consists of 5 sensors,
Treport = (2
5)12sec ≈ 6min, whereas in a network of 10 sensors, Treport ≈ 3hr, which is
clearly unacceptable. This curse of dimensionality is the main drawback of the centralized
system based on pˆx[G] adaptation.
2.6 Decentralized System with Knowledge Fusion
This section provides a method for combatting the curse of dimensionality based on the
plant decomposition with knowledge fusion. Note that while the current development is
carried out in terms of a power plant, a more general characterization of this method is
provided in Chapter III.
2.6.1 Power plant
A simplified model of a power plant is shown in Figure 2.1, where B is the boiler, HT and
LT are the high and low pressure turbines, respectively, RP is the reheat pipe, C is the con-
denser, FP is the feedwater pump, and Sij’s are the sensors. For simplicity, it is assumed
that only B, HT, RP, LT may be under a physical attack or malfunction, while C and FP are
assumed to operate normally; hence, their sensors are not included in Figure 2.1.
Having 8 sensors, the number of network states is 256. Thus, based on the temporal
properties discussed in Subsection 2.5.4, a report to the plant operator could be produced in
about every 51min. To combat this drawback, a decentralized system could be considered,
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Figure 2.1: Schematics of the power plant
where B, HT, RP, and LT are viewed as separate sub-plants monitored by their respective
sensor sub-networks (i.e., B by sensors S11 and S12, etc.). The problem with such a de-
centralized system is that inferences arising from coupling of process variables that belong
to various sub-plants are neglected. In other words if, for example, all boiler sensors are
captured by an attacker, no information about the boiler could be derived, even if all other
sensors operate normally. To alleviate this problem, we develop another approach− based,
as it is mentioned in Subsection 2.1.2, on a decentralized system with knowledge fusion
and show that it leads to reliable and timely plant condition assessments (see Section 2.8).
2.6.2 Developing the decentralized system with knowledge fusion
Assume, for simplicity, that B, HT, RP, and LT are characterized by a single process vari-
able, e.g., its temperature, denoted as V1, V2, V3, and V4, respectively, each monitored by
two sensors. Mutual influences of the temperature among sub-plants can be represented by
a directed cyclic graph shown in Figure 2.2(a). Assuming that the heat-generating capacity
of B is large enough to maintain RP temperature independent of HT conditions (normal or
anomalous), the influence HT → RP can be omitted. Similarly, under the above assump-
tion, one may ignore the influence RP → B, since B is capable of maintaining its own
temperature independent of HT and RP conditions. Further, if the heat-absorbing capacity
of C is large enough to maintain a constant water temperature at its outlet independent of
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(a) Cyclic graph
representation
(b) Tree graph
representation
Figure 2.2: Influence diagrams
LT condition, the influence LT → B can also be ignored. Under these assumptions, the
cyclic graph of Figure 2.2(a) is reduced to the tree graph of Figure 2.2(b). This implies
that the power plant can be represented as four sub-plants, denoted as GB, GHT, GRP, and
GLT, interrelated as shown in Figure 2.2(b). This partitioning induces a corresponding
partitioning of the sensor network SN into four sub-networks, SNB, SNHT, SNRP, and
SNLT, consisting of {S11,S12}, {S21,S22}, {S31,S32}, and {S41,S42}, respectively. If Xk,
k ∈ {B,HT,RP,LT}, denotes the state space of each sub-network, then the number of
states in each of them is 4, and, if the evaluation of each state takes 12sec, a report to the
operator is produced in approximately 48sec (rather than 51min, as in the centralized case).
Clearly, under this decomposition, the aforementioned report would consist of the pmf’s of
the sub-plants, i.e., p¯[B], p¯[HT], p¯[RP], and p¯[LT], rather than of a single pmf p¯[G].
Note that in this decentralized architecture, the sensor sub-networks adaptation is car-
ried out based on pˆ[Vi] (rather than pˆ[G]). This is because pˆ[Gi], i ∈ {B,HT,RP,LT},
becomes available only after the knowledge fusion of pˆ[Vi]’s is carried out.
To implement knowledge fusion calculations, couplings among process variables must
be introduced. This is accomplished based on the conditional probabilities P [Vi|Vj]. While
specific matrices representing these conditional pmf’s are given in Subsection 2.8.1, below
we describe the knowledge fusion calculations used in this work.
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2.6.3 Knowledge fusion calculations
Let p¯GB [V1], p¯GHT [V2], p¯GRP [V3], and p¯GLT [V4] be the process variable pmf’s of the sub-plants,
evaluated using the techniques described in Sections 2.2, 2.3, and 2.5. Then, fusion of this
information, leading to the sought inferences, is carried out as follows:
Algorithm II.3. Inferences for V1:
(a) Calculate the pmf of V1 based on the sensors of LT (denoted as p¯GLT [V1]):
p¯GLT [V1] =
∑
σ3∈ΣV3
P [V1|V3 = σ3]p¯GLT [V3 = σ3], (2.47)
where p¯GLT [V3] is calculated as
p¯GLT [V3] =
∑
σ4∈ΣV4
P [V3|V4 = σ4]p¯GLT [V4 = σ4]. (2.48)
(b) Calculate the pmf of V1 based on the sensors of RP:
p¯GRP [V1] =
∑
σ3∈ΣV3
P [V1|V3 = σ3]p¯GRP [V3 = σ3]. (2.49)
(c) Calculate the pmf of V1 based on the sensors of HT:
p¯GHT [V1] =
∑
σ2∈ΣV2
P [V1|V2 = σ2]p¯GHT [V2 = σ2]. (2.50)
(d) Calculate the pmf of V1 based on all sensors of the sensor network (using the Dempster-
Shafer rule):
p¯GB,HT,RP,LT [V1 = σ1] =
∏
k=B,HT,RP,LT
p¯Gk [V1 = σ1]∑
σ1∈ΣV1
∏
k=B,HT,RP,LT
p¯Gk [V1 = σ1]
. (2.51)
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(e) Finally, select p¯∗[V1] as the one of the five pmf’s obtained above, which has the smallest
entropy, i.e.,
p¯∗[V1] = argmin {I {p¯GB [V1]} , I {p¯GHT [V1]} , I {p¯GRP [V1]} ,
I {p¯GLT [V1]} , I
{
p¯GB,HT,RP,LT [V1]
}}
.
(2.52)

Fusion of other process variable pmf’s is carried out similarly, leading to p¯∗[V2], p¯∗[V3],
and p¯∗[V4].
2.7 Decentralized Resilient Monitoring System for Power Plant
Turning now to the issue of computing the pmf’s of B, HT, RP, and LT, we introduce a five-
layer architecture shown in Figure 2.3. It consists of four parallel sub-architectures, each
corresponding to a sub-plant, GB, GHT, GRP, and GLT, which could be under a physical
attack (or malfunction). The inputs to each sub- architecture are the sensor data provided
by the sub-networks SNB, SNHT, SNRP, and SNLT, which could be under a cyber attack.
The physical and cyber attacks might be either coordinated or not. The outputs of the
overall architecture are the assessed sub-plant pmf’s, i.e., p¯[B], p¯[HT], p¯[RP], p¯[LT].
The five layers of this architecture can be characterized as follows (using the sub-plant
B, as an example):
• The DQ acquisition layer remains the same as in Section 2.2.
• The process variable assessment layer consists of two parts. The first one represents
the evaluation of pˆxB [V1] using the methods of Section 2.3. The second part eval-
uates p¯GB [V1] using the expression (2.44) applied to the sub-plant (i.e., p¯GB [V1] =∑
xB∈XB
τxB pˆxB [V1], where τxB is the output of the adaptation layer).
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Figure 2.3: Five-layer resilient monitoring system architecture based on decentralization
with knowledge fusion
• The sub-network adaptation layer operates as described in Section 2.5, but using the
entropy of pˆxB [V1] as the penalty function.
• The knowledge fusion layer implements the calculations described in Subsection
2.6.3.
• The sub-plant assessment layer evaluates p¯[B], p¯[HT], p¯[RP], and p¯[LT] using the
technique of Section 2.4.
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The measure of resiliency is evaluated using (2.46) applied separately to each sub-plant,
e.g.,
MRB =
D (p[B]||pnr[B])−D (p[B]||p¯[B])
D (p[B]||pnr[B]) . (2.53)
The MR’s for HT, RP, and LT are computed similarly, resulting in the following vector:
#     »
MR = [MRB, MRHT, MRRP, MRLT] . (2.54)
Based on the calculations of Subsection 2.5.4, the assessment time in each of the sub-
architectures of Figure 2.3 is (12sec)22 = 48sec. Note that the centralized assessment of
this plant, having 8 sensors, would be (12sec)28 = 3072sec = 51.2min.
2.8 Performance Evaluation of Decentralized Resilient Monitoring Sys-
tem with Knowledge Fusion
In this section, we apply the resilient monitoring system of Figure 2.3 to the power plant of
Figure 2.1. While the statistics of process variables and the parameters of the monitoring
system are specified in the Appendix, below we introduce the sub-plant anomalies (Subsec-
tion 2.8.1), describe the attack scenarios and the resulting system performance (Subsection
2.8.2), and discuss qualitative features of the results obtained (Subsection 2.8.3).
2.8.1 Sub-plant anomalies and process variable coupling
2.8.1.1 Boiler
The anomaly of B is insulation fracture. Since the fracture results in a lower than normal
temperature, the universal set of V1 is ΣV1 := {LV1,NV1}.
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2.8.1.2 High pressure turbine
The anomaly of HT is also the insulation fracture. Taking into account the influence B
→ HT, we assume that V2 takes progressively increasing values under the following con-
ditions: Both B and HT are damaged; only B is damaged; only HT is damaged; and
both B and HT operate normally. As it follows from the above, the universal set of V2
is ΣV2 := {VLV2,L(1)V2 , L(2)V2 ,NV2}, where VL stands for Very Low, and L(1)V2 and
L(2)V2 indicate Low HT temperature due to B and HT damage, respectively.
2.8.1.3 Reheat pipe
The anomaly of RP is similar to that of B and HT, i.e., the insulation fracture. Regarding
V3, we assume that it takes increasing values under the following conditions: Both B and
RP are damaged; only B is damaged; only RP is damaged; and both B and RP operate
normally. From the above, V3 ∈ ΣV3 := {VLV3,L(1)V3 ,L(2)V3 ,NV3}.
2.8.1.4 Low pressure turbine
Since LT operates at a low pressure, we assume that the anomaly is not due to the fracture of
its insulation, but due to the inefficient transfer of energy to the output shaft, leading to the
temperature being higher than normal. Taking into account the chain of influences B→ RP
→ LT and the above assumption, V4 takes progressively increasing values under the follow-
ing conditions: LT operates normally, while RP and B are damaged; LT malfunctions, while
RP and B are damaged; LT and RP operate normally, while B is damaged; LT malfunctions
and B is damaged, while RP operates normally; LT and B operate normally, while RP is
damaged; LT malfunctions and RP is damaged, while B operates normally; LT, RP, and B
operate normally; and LT malfunctions, while RP and B operate normally. As it follows
from the above, V4 ∈ ΣV4 := {VL(1)V4 ,VL(2)V4 ,L(1)V4 ,L(2)V4 ,M(1)V4 ,M(2)V4 ,NV4 ,HV4},
where M stands for Medium and H for High.
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2.8.1.5 Coupling of process variables
As described in Subsection 2.6.2, the couplings of the process variables are characterized
by the conditional pmf’s P [Vi|Vj]. Taking into account the universal sets introduced above,
these pmf’s are as follows:
P [V1|V2] = P [V1|V3] =

 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1


︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
, P [V2|V1] = P [V3|V1] =


0.5 0
0.5 0
0 0.5
0 0.5


︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
, (2.55)
P [V3|V4] =

 A 02×4
02×4 A

 , P [V4|V3] =

 B 04×2
04×2 B

 , (2.56)
where the matrices A and B are given in (2.55).
2.8.1.6 Universal sets of the sub-plants
Since each sub-plant is characterized by a single anomaly, the random variable Gi, i ∈
{B,HT,RP,LT}, which represents its status, has the universal set comprised of two out-
comes, {NGi,AGi}, i ∈ {B,HT, RP,LT}, where, as before, NGi and AGi stand for normal
and anomalous status of the sub-plant Gi, respectively.
2.8.2 Attack scenarios and the resulting monitoring system performance
In this section, we introduce seven cyber and cyber-physical attack scenarios selected so
as to exhibit the main features of the resilient monitoring system designed herein. As it
may be expected, physical attacks on the sub-plants are less damaging for resilient mon-
itoring than cyber attacks on the sensors. Nevertheless, to illustrate that every sub-plant
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status (normal or anomalous) can be identified with or without a physical attack, we in-
clude cyber-physical attacks into consideration as well.
Scenario 1: Cyber attack on the boiler: All sub-plants operate normally. All sensors mon-
itoring B are captured and project misleading information that the boiler is damaged. All
other sensors operate normally.
Performance: The resilient monitoring system computes the following pmf’s:
p¯[GB] = [0.95, 0.05], p¯[GHT] = [0.9, 0.1], p¯[GRP] = [0.91, 0.09],
p¯[GLT] = [0.92, 0.08],
(2.57)
correctly indicating that all sub-plants operate normally with large probability. The non-
resilient monitoring system (i.e., the system with DQ’s of all sensors equal to 1 − see
Subsection 2.5.3) evaluates the pmf of B as pnr[GB] = [0.05, 0.95], erroneously indicating
that the boiler is damaged. Using (2.53) and (2.54), the measure of resiliency under this
scenario is calculated as #     »MR = [0.98,−,−,−] , where “−” indicates that none of the
sensors of the corresponding sub-plant are attacked.
Scenario 2: Cyber attack on the low pressure turbine: All sub-plants operate normally.
All sensors of LT are under attack, reporting that it is malfunctioning. All other sensors
operate normally.
Performance: The resilient monitoring system computes the following pmf’s:
p¯[GB] = [0.95, 0.05], p¯[GHT] = [0.9, 0.1], p¯[GRP] = [0.91, 0.09],
p¯[GLT] = [0.49, 0.51],
(2.58)
implying that, while the status of B, HT, and RP is ascertained correctly, the status of LT is
undetermined (i.e., either normal or anomalous with almost equal probabilities). The non-
resilient monitoring system evaluates the pmf of LT as pnr[GLT] = [0.09, 0.91], erroneously
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indicating that LT is malfunctioning. The measure of resiliency in this case is #     »MR =
[−,−,−, 0.7]. Note, however, that if only one sensor of LT was captured, the status of all
sub-plants would be assessed correctly with the pmf’s
p¯[GB] = [0.95, 0.05], p¯[GHT] = [0.9, 0.1], p¯[GRP] = [0.91, 0.09],
p¯[GLT] = [0.91, 0.09].
Scenario 3: Coordinated cyber-physical attack on the reheat pipe: RP is under attack, re-
sulting in insulation fracture. All other sub-plants operate normally. Since RP is attacked,
the temperature of LT is M(1)V4 . All sensors of RP are captured, forcing them to indicate
that RP is normal. All other sensors are not attacked.
Performance: The pmf’s of B, HT, RP, and LT are computed as follows:
p¯[GB] = [0.95, 0.05], p¯[GHT] = [0.9, 0.1], p¯[GRP] = [0.12, 0.88],
p¯[GLT] = [0.92, 0.08],
(2.59)
correctly identifying the status of all sub-plants. The non-resilient monitoring system eval-
uates the pmf of RP as pnr[GRP] = [0.91, 0.09], i.e., erroneously. The measure of resiliency
is #     »MR = [−,−, 0.95,−]. Note that if the attack was not coordinated, e.g., physical attack
on RP and cyber attack, say, on LT, the status of LT would be undetermined, i.e.,
p¯[GB] = [0.95, 0.05], p¯[GHT] = [0.9, 0.1], p¯[GRP] = [0.12, 0.88],
p¯[GLT] = [0.49, 0.51].
Scenario 4: Coordinated cyber-physical attack on the high pressure turbine: HT is under
attack, resulting in fracture of its insulation, with V2 being L(2)V2 . All other sub-plants
operate normally. All sensors of HT are captured, forcing them to indicate that its status is
normal. All other sensors are not attacked.
35
Performance: The pmf’s of the sub-plants are computed as follows:
p¯[GB] = [0.95, 0.05], p¯[GHT] = [0.51, 0.49], p¯[GRP] = [0.91, 0.09],
p¯[GLT] = [0.92, 0.08],
(2.60)
correctly identifying the status of B, RP, and LT, while that of HT is undetermined. The
non-resilient monitoring system evaluates the pmf of HT as pnr[GHT] = [0.9, 0.1], i.e., erro-
neously indicating that HT is normal. The measure of resiliency is #     »MR = [−, 0.69,−,−].
If only one sensor of HT was captured, the status of all sub-plants would be ascertained
correctly with the pmf’s
p¯[GB] = [0.95, 0.05], p¯[GHT] = [0.11, 0.89], p¯[GRP] = [0.91, 0.09],
p¯[GLT] = [0.92, 0.08].
If the attack was not coordinated, e.g., a physical attack on HT and a cyber attack on all
sensors of B, the resulting performance would be
p¯[GB] = [0.95, 0.05], p¯[GHT] = [0.1, 0.9], p¯[GRP] = [0.91, 0.09],
p¯[GLT] = [0.92, 0.08],
indicating that all sub-plants are assessed correctly.
Scenario 5: Coordinated cyber-physical attack on the boiler and low pressure turbine: B
and LT are under attack, resulting in insulation damage of the former and malfunctioning
of the latter, with V1 being LV1 and V4 being L(2)V4 . All other sub-plants operate normally,
with V2 being L(1)V2 and V3 being L(1)V3 . All sensors of B and LT are captured, forcing
them to indicate that their status is normal. All other sensors are not attacked.
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Performance: The pmf’s of the sub-plants are computed as follows:
p¯[GB] = [0.05, 0.95], p¯[GHT] = [0.9, 0.1], p¯[GRP] = [0.91, 0.09],
p¯[GLT] = [0.51, 0.49],
(2.61)
correctly identifying the status of B, HT, and RP, while the status of LT is undetermined.
The non-resilient monitoring system evaluates the pmf’s of B and LT as pnr[GB] = [0.95, 0.05]
and pnr[GLT] = [0.92, 0.08], erroneously assessing them as normal. The measure of re-
siliency is #     »MR = [0.98,−,−, 0.72]. If only one sensor of LT was captured, the status of
all sub-plants would be ascertained correctly with the pmf’s
p¯[GB] = [0.05, 0.95], p¯[GHT] = [0.9, 0.1], p¯[GRP] = [0.91, 0.09],
p¯[GLT] = [0.1, 0.9].
Note also that if the attack was not coordinated, e.g., physical attack on LT and cyber attack
on all sensors of B, the resulting performance would be
p¯[GB] = [0.95, 0.05], p¯[GHT] = [0.9, 0.1], p¯[GRP] = [0.91, 0.09],
p¯[GLT] = [0.09, 0.91],
indicating that all sub-plants are assessed correctly.
Scenario 6: Coordinated cyber-physical attack on the boiler, reheat pipe, and low pres-
sure turbine: B, RP, and LT are under attack, with V1, V3, and V4 being LV1 , VLV3 , and
VL(2)V4 , respectively. The remaining sub-plant, HT, operates normally. All sensors that
monitor B, RP, and LT are captured, forcing them to indicate that their status is normal.
The sensors of HT are not attacked.
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Performance: The pmf’s of the sub-plants are computed as follows:
p¯[GB] = [0.05, 0.95], p¯[GHT] = [0.9, 0.1], p¯[GRP] = [0.51, 0.49],
p¯[GLT] = [0.5, 0.5],
(2.62)
correctly identifying the status of B and HT, while the status of RP and LT is undetermined.
The non-resilient monitoring system evaluates the pmf’s of B, RP, and LT as pnr[GB] =
[0.95, 0.05], pnr[GRP] = [0.9, 0.1], and pnr[GLT] = [0.92, 0.08], erroneously assessing them
as normal. The measure of resiliency is #     »MR = [0.98,−, 0.7, 0.72]. If only one sensor of
LT was captured, the status of all sub-plants would be ascertained correctly with the pmf’s
p¯[GB] = [0.05, 0.95], p¯[GHT] = [0.9, 0.1], p¯[GRP] = [0.12, 0.88],
p¯[GLT] = [0.09, 0.91].
If the attack was not coordinated, e.g., physical attack on LT and all sensors of B and RP
being captured, the status of all sub-plants would be assessed correctly with the pmf’s
p¯[GB] = [0.95, 0.05], p¯[GHT] = [0.9, 0.1], p¯[GRP] = [0.91, 0.09],
p¯[GLT] = [0.09, 0.91].
Scenario 7: Coordinated cyber-physical attack on all sub-plants: All sub-plants are at-
tacked, resulting in their anomalous operation. All sensors are captured, forcing them to
indicate that their status is normal.
Performance: The status of all sub-plants is undetermined with the pmf’s being close
to [0.5, 0.5]. The non-resilient monitoring system evaluates erroneously that all sub-plants
are normal. The measure of resiliency is #     »MR = [0.76, 0.7, 0.7, 0.72]. If one sensor of HT
was not captured, the pmf’s of the sub-plants would be
p¯[GB] = [0.05, 0.95], p¯[GHT] = [0.1, 0.9], p¯[GRP] = [0.5, 0.5],
p¯[GLT] = [0.5, 0.5],
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i.e., B and HT are assessed correctly, while RP and LT are undetermined. If one sensor of
HT and one sensor of LT were not captured, the pmf’s of the sub-plants would be
p¯[GB] = [0.05, 0.95], p¯[GHT] = [0.1, 0.9], p¯[GRP] = [0.12, 0.88],
p¯[GLT] = [0.09, 0.91],
i.e., all are assessed correctly.
2.8.3 Discussion
The above results lead to the following conclusions:
• Under all attack scenarios considered, the resilient monitoring system provides no
erroneous assessments (as insinuated by the attacker).
• As evidenced by Scenarios 1-4, cyber attacks on HT and LT are more dangerous than
those on B and RP. This is due to the structure of the conditional probability matrices
(2.55), which permit inferences from HT and LT to B and RP, but not vice-versa. In
other words, cyber-attacking the terminal nodes of the graph of Figure 2.2(b) is more
dangerous than attacking the initial and/or intermediate ones.
• As evidenced from Scenarios 3 and 4, coordinated cyber-physical attacks may not be
more dangerous than non-coordinated ones. More important is not the coordination,
but the nature of a cyber attack − involving or not the terminal nodes of the graph.
• As follows from Scenario 7, the minimum number of non-attacked sensors necessary
and sufficient to correctly assess all sub-plants is 2: one for HT and one for LT.
If these sensors were made “known-secure”, the plant assessment would never be
compromised.
• In all cases considered, the measure of system resiliency is quite high: from 0.69
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(when some sub-plants status remains undetermined) to close to 1 (when all sub-
plants status is assessed with certainty).
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CHAPTER III
Combating Curse of Dimensionality in Resilient
Monitoring Systems: Conditions for Lossless
Decomposition
3.1 Introduction
As described in Chapter II, the adaptation of the sensor network can be carried out either in
a centralized or decentralized manner. The former, which is applied in our previous work
[17], suffers from the curse of dimensionality, namely, the assessment time of the plant
condition, Ta, behaves as
Ta = κ2
NSN , (3.1)
where the pre-exponential factor, κ, depends on the assessment algorithms involved, and
NSN is the number of sensors in the network. This implies that even if κ is relatively small,
say, κ = 1sec, Ta is 17min if NSN = 10 and 12 days if NSN = 20. Clearly, such a long
assessment time may be unacceptable in most applications. To address this shortcoming,
the decentralized system was introduced in Section 2.7, wherein the development was car-
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ried out in terms of a power plant application. While the resulting decentralized resilient
monitoring system was shown to provide both timely and reliable assessments, a rigorous
analysis of the developed approach was not provided. The current chapter is devoted to this
issue.
The decentralized system is based on a decomposition of the sensor network into sub-
networks, each monitoring a small subset of plant process variables. In the sequel, we
assume that each of these subnetworks monitors a single process variable, although the
case of subnetworks monitoring a group of process variables can be considered similarly.
Thus, if a plant has M process variables (e.g., temperatures, pressures, flow rates, etc.),
the sensor network, SN, is decoupled into M subnetworks, SN1, ...,SNM , leading to the
assessment time in each subnetwork given by
Ta,i = κi2
NSNi , (3.2)
where NSNi is the number of sensors monitoring the process variable i. Therefore, even
if the pre-exponential factor is somewhat increased (i.e., κi > κ, ∀i), the assessment time
would decrease substantially if NSNi << NSN, ∀i. For instance, if NSNi ≤ 2, ∀i, and
κi = 1.5sec, ∀i, the process variable assessment time is less than 6sec, irrespective of NSN.
In other words, the assessment of each process variable could be carried out sufficiently
rapidly, and the resulting information could be used for plant condition assessment practi-
cally instantaneously (based on the algorithm provided in Chapter II).
Clearly, this decomposition may reduce the quality of process variable and plant condi-
tion assessment. For example, if all sensors monitoring a process variable are attacked, no
assessment of its state would be made. To avoid this deficiency, we employ the so-called
decentralized inference calculations (or, as it is termed in Chapter II, knowledge fusion cal-
culations), whereby mutual influences of process variables are taken into account. In terms
of the power plant, this implies that even if all boiler sensors are attacked, the sensors of the
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other components may be used to infer information about the boiler status. The question
arises: Under which conditions this decomposition leads to no information losses, as com-
pared with the centralized inference calculations utilized in [17]? The main contribution
of this chapter is in providing an answer to this question.
The outline of this chapter is as follows: Section 3.2 introduces the model considered
and formalizes the problem addressed. In Section 3.3, the algorithms used in the central-
ized and the decentralized process variable assessments are described. Section 3.4 provides
a sufficient condition under which the decentralized inference calculations lead to no infor-
mation losses as compared with the centralized ones. Finally, in Section 3.5, a sufficient
condition for lossless decentralization is derived.
3.2 Model and Problem Formulation
Consider the plant G with process variables Vi, i = 1, ...,M , each viewed as a random
variable, Vi, with the universal set ΣVi = {NVi ,AVi,1, ...,AVi,ni−1}, where NVi stands for
Normal and AVi,l for an anomaly of type l (induced either by a physical attack or mal-
function), and ni is the cardinality of ΣVi . The coupling among the process variables is
characterized by a set of conditional probabilities P [Vi|Vj], i 6= j, i, j = 1, ...,M .
The plant G is monitored by the sensor network SN comprised of NSN sensors, which
could be either under a cyber-physical attack or malfunction. The SN can be viewed as
a set of subnetworks, SNi, i = 1, ...,M , each monitoring the process variable Vi and
consisting of NSNi sensors, so that
∑M
i=1NSNi = NSN. Since the state space, X , of SN
consists of vectors comprised of 1’s and 0’s, the cardinality of X is 2NSN . Similarly, the
state space of SNi is Yi with the cardinality 2NSNi , i = 1, ...,M . Clearly, X can be viewed
as the Cartesian product of Yi’s,
X = Y1 × Y2 × · · ·YM , (3.3)
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and each state x ∈ X can be viewed as the ordered concatenation of the states yi ∈ Yi, i.e.,
x = (y1, y2, ..., yM). (3.4)
Given this model, the centralized and the decentralized assessments of process variables
Vi, i = 1, ...,M , can be symbolically represented as follows:
Centralized:
{
pˆyi[Vi]⊗ pˆyj [Vi], ∀j 6= i
}⇒ pˆx[Vi] optimization over X==========⇒ pˆx∗i [Vi]. (3.5)
Decentralized:
pˆyi[Vi]
optimization over Yi
==========⇒ {pˆy∗i [Vi]⊗ pˆy∗j [Vi], ∀j 6= i}⇒ pˆ(y∗1 ,y∗2 ,...,y∗M)[Vi]. (3.6)
The notations involved in these expressions are:
Centralized:
• pˆyi[Vi] is the probability mass function (pmf) of Vi, estimated when SNi is in the
state yi ∈ Yi.
• pˆyj [Vi] is the centralized inferred pmf of Vi, calculated when SNj is in the state
yj ∈ Yj .
• Symbol ⊗ denotes the Dempster-Shafer combination of the pmf’s involved.
• pˆx[Vi] is the pmf of Vi, estimated when SN is in the state x = (y1, y2, ..., yM) ∈ X .
• pˆx∗i [Vi] is the centralized optimal pmf of Vi, estimated when SN is in the state x
∗
i ∈
X , resulting in the smallest entropy of pˆx[Vi].
Decentralized:
• pˆyi[Vi] is the same as in the centralized case.
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• pˆy∗i [Vi] is the decentralized optimal pmf of Vi, estimated when SNi is in the state
y∗i ∈ Yi, resulting in the smallest entropy of pˆyi[Vi].
• pˆy∗j [Vi] is the decentralized inferred pmf of Vi, estimated when SNj , j = 1, ...,M ,
j 6= i, is in its state y∗j ∈ Yj , resulting in the smallest entropy of pˆyj [Vj].
• Finally, pˆ(y∗1 ,y∗2 ,...,y∗M)[Vi] is the decentralized optimal pmf of Vi, estimated when SN
is in the state (y∗1, y∗2, ..., y∗M) ∈ X .
While the calculations involved in evaluating these pmf’s are described in Section 3.3,
below we comment on the main differences between the centralized and the decentralized
process variable assessments:
(α) The centralized system uses all the pmf’s, pˆyi[Vi] and pˆyj [Vi], ∀j 6= i, in order to
evaluate x∗i , whereas the decentralized one uses only the locally optimal pmf’s, pˆy∗i [Vi] and
pˆy∗j [Vi], to evaluate (y
∗
1, y
∗
2, ..., y
∗
M). The latter may lead to information losses, which is a
drawback of the decentralization.
(β) The centralized system carries out the optimization in X , whereas the decentralized
one in Yi, i = 1, ...,M . The latter leads to a reduction of the process variable assessment
time, which is the advantage of the decentralization.
The main problem addressed in this chapter is as follows: Derive a sufficient condition
under which the decentralization leads to no loss of information, formalized as
x∗i = (y
∗
1, y
∗
2, ..., y
∗
M), ∀i, (3.7)
and, consequently,
pˆ(y∗1 ,y∗2 ,...,y∗M)[Vi] = pˆx∗i [Vi], ∀i. (3.8)
A solution of this problem is given in Sections 3.4 and 3.5. As it turns out, the sought
conditions depend on the properties of the process variable coupling, P [Vi|Vj], i 6= j,
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i, j = 1, ...,M , and on the monotonicity property of the Dempster-Shafer combination rule
applied to the set of pmf’s pˆyj [Vi], i, j = 1, ...,M .
3.3 Centralized and Decentralized Process Variable Assessment Pro-
cedures
Although the techniques utilized here are the same as in Chapter II, they are briefly de-
scribed below for the sake of clarity.
3.3.1 Centralized case
Assessment of pˆyi [Vi]: If the state yi ∈ Yi has a single non-zero element, the evaluation
of pˆyi [Vi] is carried out based on the data reported by this sensor and its data quality (DQ).
The sensor’s data and DQ are the inputs to the h-procedure, the steady state of which
provides the sought pmf:
pˆyi [Vi = σ] = p[Si = σ]DQ+
1−DQ
|ΣVi |
, σ ∈ ΣVi , i = 1, 2, ...,M, (3.9)
where Si is the random variable characterizing the sensor data; p[Si = σ], σ ∈ ΣVi , is its
pmf; ΣVi is the universal set of Vi; and |ΣVi| is the cardinality of ΣVi . As it follows from
(3.9), pˆyi[Vi] = p[Si], (i.e., Si faithfully represents Vi) if DQ = 1 and pˆyi[Vi] = 1|ΣVi | (i.e.,
pˆyi[Vi] is uniform and, thus, Si carries no information about Vi) if DQ = 0.
If yi has more than one non-zero element, for each of them the pmf is evaluated using
(3.9) and then the Dempster-Shafer rule is used to combine these pmf’s. For instance, if yi
has two non-zero components, resulting in pˆyi,1[Vi] and pˆyi,2[Vi], the combined pmf is
pˆyi [Vi = σ] = pˆyi,1;yi,2[Vi = σ] =
pˆyi,1[Vi = σ]pˆyi,2[Vi = σ]∑
σ∈ΣVi
pˆyi,1[Vi = σ]pˆyi,2[Vi = σ]
, σ ∈ ΣVi . (3.10)
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When yi has more than two non-zero components, say k > 2 non-zero components, the
pmf pˆyi [Vi] is computed similarly, i.e.,
pˆyi [Vi = σ] =
k∏
j=1
pˆyi,j[Vi = σ]
∑
σ∈ΣVi
k∏
j=1
pˆyi,j[Vi = σ]
, σ ∈ ΣVi , i = 1, 2, ...,M. (3.11)
Assessment of pˆyj [Vi = σ]: If SNj is in the state yj ∈ Yj leading to pˆyj [Vj], the induced
pmf pˆyj [Vi], j 6= i, is calculated using the total probability formula,
pˆyj [Vi] =
∑
σ∈ΣVj
P [Vi|Vj = σ]pˆyj [Vj = σ], σ ∈ ΣVj , yj ∈ Yj, i 6= j, (3.12)
where P [Vi|Vj], i 6= j, is the process variable coupling introduced in Section 3.2.
Assessment of pˆx[Vi]: If each SNj , j = 1, ...,M , is in the state yj ∈ Yj , the overall
network, SN, is in the state x = (y1, y2, ..., yM) and, therefore, pˆx[Vi] can be calculated by
combining pˆyi[Vi] and pˆyj [Vi], i 6= j, using the Dempster-Shafer rule:
pˆx[Vi = σ] = pˆ(y1,y2,...,yM)[Vi = σ] =
M∏
j=1
pˆyj [Vi = σ]
∑
σ∈ΣVi
M∏
j=1
pˆyj [Vi = σ]
, σ ∈ ΣVi . (3.13)
Assessment of pˆx∗i [Vi]: This is carried out using the method of rational controllers,
where one controller is assigned to each Vi, i = 1, 2, ...,M , with the decision space beingX
and the penalty function being the entropy of pˆx[Vi], x ∈ X , i = 1, 2, ...,M . These rational
controllers were introduced in [17], and shown to perform well in all cyber-physical attack
scenarios considered. The application of this method results in the identification of x∗i , thus
leading to pˆx∗i [Vi].
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3.3.2 Decentralized case
Assessment of pˆyi [Vi]: This assessment is carried out in the same manner as in the
centralized case.
Assessment of pˆy∗i [Vi]: Here, a rational controller is associated with each subnetwork
SNi, i = 1, 2, ...,M , i.e., it operates in the decision space Yi with the penalty function
being the entropy of pˆyi[Vi], yi ∈ Yi. As a result, the state y∗i , corresponding to the smallest
entropy of pˆyi [Vi], is identified.
Assessment of pˆy∗j [Vi]: This is carried out using the above pmf pˆy∗j [Vj ] and the process
variable coupling P [Vi|Vj ], i 6= j, by applying the total probability formula:
pˆy∗j [Vi] =
∑
σ∈ΣVj
P [Vi|Vj = σ]pˆy∗j [Vj = σ], σ ∈ ΣVj , y∗j ∈ Yj, i 6= j. (3.14)
Assessment of pˆ(y∗1 ,y∗2 ,...,y∗M)[Vi]: This is carried out using the pmf’s pˆy∗i [Vi] and pˆy∗j [Vi],
i 6= j, by applying the Dempster-Shafer combination rule:
pˆ(y∗1 ,y∗2 ,...,y∗M)[Vi = σ] =
M∏
j=1
pˆy∗j [Vi = σ]
∑
σ∈ΣVi
M∏
j=1
pˆy∗j [Vi = σ]
, σ ∈ ΣVi , i = 1, 2, ...,M. (3.15)
3.3.3 Assessment entropy
As described above, the assessments of pˆx∗i [Vi] and pˆy∗i [Vi], i = 1, ...,M , are based on
selecting a pmf with the smallest entropy. In Chapter II, the Shannon entropy, [55], defined
by
I{p[V ]} = −
∑
σ∈ΣV
p[V = σ] log|ΣV | p[V = σ], (3.16)
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has been used for this purpose. It turns out, however, that the Renyi-2 entropy [56],
H2{p[V ]} = − log|ΣV |
(∑
σ∈ΣV
{p[V = σ]}2
)
, (3.17)
is more appropriate for the problem at hand. The reason is that, as it is shown in [57], the
Renyi-2 entropy is more effective in quantifying the so-called “guesswork” (GW ), which
is defined as the expected number of trials necessary to guess the outcome of a random
variable. Since the assessments in both the centralized and the decentralized cases are con-
ceptually related to GW , and since the Renyi-2 entropy has been shown to be effective in a
number of random signal processing problems, [58–60], the current chapter uses H2{p[V ]}
in both the centralized and the decentralized process variable assessment procedures.
3.4 Condition for Lossless Decentralized Inference Assessment
In this section, we derive a sufficient condition under which no loss of information takes
place due to the decentralized inference calculation as compared with the centralized one.
Represent the conditional pmf P [Vi|Vj ], i 6= j, as a set of column-vectors:
P [Vi|Vj] =
[
p
(1)
Vi|Vj
p
(2)
Vi|Vj
· · · p(nj)
Vi|Vj
]
, p
(1)
Vi|Vj
,p
(2)
Vi|Vj
, ...,p
(nj)
Vi|Vj
∈ Rni, i 6= j, (3.18)
where ni is the cardinality of ΣVi . Recall that the components of the pVi|Vj ’s, are on [0, 1]
and their sum is 1. Introduce:
Assumption III.1. (a) The 2-norm of all the columns of matrix P [Vi|Vj], i 6= j, are the
same, i.e.,
‖p(1)
Vi|Vj
‖2 = ‖p(2)Vi|Vj‖2 = · · · = ‖p
(nj)
Vi|Vj
‖2, i 6= j. (3.19)
(b) The inner products of every pair of columns of matrix P [Vi|Vj], i 6= j, are the same,
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i.e.,
〈p(1)
Vi|Vj
,p
(2)
Vi|Vj
〉 = 〈p(1)
Vi|Vj
,p
(3)
Vi|Vj
〉 = · · · = 〈p(nj−1)
Vi|Vj
,p
(nj)
Vi|Vj
〉, i 6= j. (3.20)

While this assumption seems quite formal, its practical implication is as follows:
Lemma III.1. Under Assumption III.1, if the pmf’s pˆl[Vj ] and pˆm[Vj], l 6= m, l, m ∈
Yj , have equal information about the process variable Vj , then the inferred pmf’s pˆl[Vi]
and pˆm[Vi], l 6= m, l, m ∈ Yj , i 6= j, calculated according to (3.12), also have equal
information about Vi. In other words,
H2{pˆl[Vj ]} = H2{pˆm[Vj ]} =⇒ H2{pˆl[Vi]} = H2{pˆm[Vi]}, l 6= m ∈ Yj, i 6= j. (3.21)
Proof. See the Appendix. 
Thus, Assumption III.1 guarantees that the quality of induced pmf’s remain the same,
if the original pmf’s are equally informative. This property leads to
Theorem III.1. Under Assumption III.1, the optimal decentralized inferred pmf pˆy∗j [Vi],
calculated according (3.14), has the same information as the most informative centralized
inferred pmf, calculated according to (3.12), i.e.,
H2{pˆy∗j [Vi]} = minyj∈Yj H2{pˆyj [Vi]}. (3.22)
Proof. See the Appendix. 
Thus, this theorem provides a sufficient condition under which the decentralized in-
ferred pmf (which requires the pmf evaluated at only y∗j ∈ Yj) does not lead to information
losses as compared with the centralized inferred pmf assessments (which require the pmf’s
evaluation at all states yj ∈ Yj).
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3.5 Condition for Lossless Overall Decentralized Assessment
As mentioned before, the decentralized optimal pmf of all the Vi’s are evaluated at the
sensor network state (y∗1, y∗2, ..., y∗M) ∈ X . Regarding the centralized system, the optimal
pmf of Vi is evaluated at the sensor network state x∗i ∈ X . Given this situation, a question
arises: Under what conditions are the decentralized and the centralized optimal states the
same, i.e., x∗i = (y∗1, y∗2, ..., y∗M), ∀i? This question is addressed below.
Recall that the calculation of pˆ(y∗1 ,y∗2 ,...,y∗M)[Vi] is based on the Dempster-Shafer (D-S)
combination rule (3.15). This rule is known to be, in general, non-monotonic [61] in the
sense that D-S combination of two pmf’s, say, pˆ1[V ] and pˆ2[V ], may have larger entropy
than either of the constituent pmf’s. This issue has been investigated in [13], where it
has been shown that this does not take place (i.e., the D-S combination rule is, in fact,
monotonic) if the constituent pmf’s are sufficiently “close” to each other. As it turns out, a
condition for the overall lossless decentralization depends on the monotonicity property of
D-S rule. Specifically, introduce:
Assumption III.2. The Dempster-Shafer combination rule is monotonic on the set of pmf’s{
pˆyj [Vi]
}
, i, j = 1, 2, ...,M , in the sense that
if H2{pˆyj [Vi]} ≤ H2{pˆy¯j [Vi]}, yj, y¯j ∈ Yj, ∀j,
then H2{pˆ(y1,y2,...,yM)[Vi]} ≤ H2{pˆ(y¯1,y¯2,...,y¯M)[Vi]}, ∀i.
(3.23)

This assumption implies the monotonicity mentioned above, as stated by:
Lemma III.2. Under Assumption III.2,
H2{pˆ(y1,y2,...,yM)[Vi]} ≤ min {H2{pˆy1[Vi]}, H2{pˆy2 [Vi]}, ..., H2{pˆyM [Vi]}} , ∀i. (3.24)
Proof. See the Appendix. 
51
Now, consider the following theorem:
Theorem III.2. Under Assumptions III.1 and III.2, the centralized optimal state x∗i is the
same for all i, i.e., x∗i = x∗, and, moreover, x∗ coincides with the decentralized optimal
state (y∗1, y
∗
2, ..., y
∗
M). Therefore,
H2{pˆ(y∗1 ,y∗2 ,...,y∗M)[Vi]} = H2{pˆx∗ [Vi]}, i = 1, 2, ...,M. (3.25)
Proof. See the Appendix. 
Note that although this theorem is not constructive (since Assumption III.2 cannot be
verified in a decentralized manner), it nevertheless specifies conditions for a lossless de-
centralization.
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CHAPTER IV
Resilient Control Systems: Model Predictive Control
Approach
4.1 Introduction
The resilient control system is intended to calculate plant control inputs based on the plant
(or sub-plant) model and the process variable pmf’s, pˆ[Vi], i = 1, ...,M , provided by the
resilient monitoring system (see Chapter II). Here, the objective of the control design is
to steer the process variable to the desired value in the steady state, while ensuring that it
remains in a safe domain in the transients. If the above pmf’s were of zero entropy, clas-
sical control techniques could be applied. However, when the sensors are under attack, the
entropy is non-zero, and new control techniques are necessary. This is because the feed-
back system to be developed can be neither output-based nor state space-based, but must
be “pmf of the output-based” control.
The approach developed here can be briefly described as follows: Let Usafe be the con-
trol input, which maintains the process variable in the safe domain irrespective of the plant
status, and Udes be the control input, which is necessary to ensure that the process variable
would take the desired value if the process variable pmf had zero entropy. Then the re-
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silient control input, Ures, is defined as Ures = ∆Udes+(1−∆)Usafe, where 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ 1 is a
weighting factor, which is selected based on an optimization procedure. Specifically, when
the entropy of pˆ[Vi] is small, the input Udes is suitable for resilient control, and, therefore,
the ∆ is selected to be close to 1. However, when the entropy of pˆ[Vi] is large, the Udes may
steer the process variable outside the safe domain, and, hence, the ∆ is selected to be close
to 0. The above mentioned optimization procedure for calculating ∆ is similar to those of
model predictive control, [1], but is based on the process variable pmf, rather than on the
process variable itself.
Although the current chapter presents just the initial results on resilient control systems,
we believe that they form a foundation for extensions and future developments in this area
of control research.
4.2 Results To-Date in Resilient Controller Design
The architecture of the resilient control system is shown in Figure 4.1, which combines the
resilient monitoring system architecture of Figure 2.3 with the pmf-based control, Ures,i.
The design of this controller is based on the following: Assume that a sub-plant G (for
the sake of brevity we omit its subscript) is described by the SISO system
xσ(n+ 1) = Aσxσ(n) +BσUres(n), xσ ∈ Rq, Ures ∈ R, n = 0, 1, ...,
V˜ (n) = Cσxσ(n), V˜ ∈ R, n = 0, 1, ..., σ ∈ {LV ,NV ,HV },
(4.1)
where the pair {Aσ, Bσ}, σ ∈ {LV ,NV ,HV }, is controllable, and the eigenvalues of Aσ,
σ ∈ {LV ,NV ,HV }, are in the interior of the unit circle on the complex plane. Define the
resilient control input as follows:
Ures(n) = ∆(n)Udes(n) + [1−∆(n)]Usafe(n), n = 0, 1, ..., (4.2)
where Usafe(n), Udes(n), and ∆(n) are to be determined. This is accomplished below.
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Figure 4.1: Proposed architecture of resilient control system
4.2.1 Calculation of Usafe
The value of Usafe is selected as an open-loop control input to ensure that the steady state
of the process variable is within the safe domain, [Vmin, Vmax], irrespective of its status. To
formalize this, introduce the d.c. gain, ασ, σ ∈ {LV ,NV ,HV }, of the above state space
system in the status σ, σ ∈ {LV ,NV ,HV }, as
ασ = Cσ[I − Aσ]−1Bσ, σ ∈ {LV ,NV ,HV }, (4.3)
and denote the minimum and maximum values of these d.c. gains as
αmin = min {αLV , αNV , αHV } , αmax = max {αLV , αNV , αHV } . (4.4)
Introduce the following assumption:
Assumption IV.1. The minimum and maximum values of the d.c. gains of the process
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variable are such that
αmax
αmin
<
Vmax
Vmin
, (4.5)
where Vmin and Vmax characterize the safe domain of the process variable.

Now, consider the following lemma:
Lemma IV.1. Under Assumption IV.1, the value of the input Usafe can be selected as any
constant in the interval
Usafe ∈
[
Vmin
αmin
,
Vmax
αmax
]
. (4.6)
Proof. See the Appendix. 
Thus, the above lemma implies that under Usafe the steady state value of the process
variable is in the safe domain, i.e., Usafeασ ∈ [Vmin, Vmax], ∀σ ∈ {LV ,NV ,HV }.
In a typical feedback control system, the sensor measurements can be used to determine
the initial condition, x(0), of the plant; for instance, this may be accomplished by utilizing
an observer. Then, based on the outputs of the observer, a control input can be calculated
such that the resulting closed-loop system satisfies both the steady state and the transient
performance specifications. However, in the current situation, the sensor measurements
may be compromised, and, therefore, the use of an observer may not be appropriate. Thus,
we consider the following scenario: Assume that at time n = 0, the sub-plant is in the
steady state under the input Usafe, i.e.,
xσ(0) = [I −Aσ]−1BσUsafe, σ ∈ {LV ,NV ,HV },
V˜ (0) = Cσxσ(0), σ ∈ {LV ,NV ,HV },
(4.7)
where, due to Lemma IV.1, we have V˜ (0) ∈ [Vmin, Vmax], irrespective of the status σ ∈
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{LV ,NV ,HV }. Here, the problem is to determine the specific σ that takes place at n = 0,
and, based on this information, compute an “appropriate” control input so that the control
objectives are met, i.e., the process variable takes the desired value in the steady state, while
remaining in the safe domain in the transients. The first part of this problem is solved using
the resilient monitoring system, which is assumed to provide the estimate of the pmf of
the process variable, pˆ[V (0) = σ], σ ∈ {LV ,NV ,HV }, at time n = 0. (Here, the resilient
monitoring system may be viewed as the “observer”.) The second part of the above problem
is addressed below.
4.2.2 Calculation of Udes
To define Udes, introduce the two-degree of freedom control law, Uσ, which steers the
process variable to the desired value, Vdes, if the actual status of the process variable were
σ:
Uσ(n) = −K1,σxˆσ,Uσ(n) +K2,σVdes, n = 0, 1, 2, ..., σ ∈ {LV ,NV ,HV }, (4.8)
where xˆσ,Uσ ∈ Rq, σ ∈ {LV ,NV ,HV }, is the “predicted” state vector of the sub-plant under
the input Uσ, σ ∈ {LV ,NV ,HV }, i.e.,
xˆσ,Uσ(n+ 1) = Aσxˆσ,Uσ(n) +BσUσ(n), n = 0, 1, ..., σ ∈ {LV ,NV ,HV },
xˆσ,Uσ(0) = xσ(0), σ ∈ {LV ,NV ,HV }.
(4.9)
As it may be observed from this equation, the initial condition, xˆσ,Uσ(0), for the prediction
is the same as the initial state vector of the plant, xσ(0) (defined in (4.7)). In the control law
(4.8), the K1,σ ∈ R1×q is a row vector of feedback gains, selected so that the eigenvalues
of (Aσ − BσK1,σ) are within the unit circle, and the K2,σ ∈ R is a scalar, selected so that
the d.c. gain of the closed loop transfer function, K2,σCσ [zI − (Aσ −BσK1,σ)]−1Bσ, is
1. Clearly, if the actual status of V is σ, the input Uσ(n) would steer the process variable to
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Vdes. However, since the status of V is unknown, the application of the incorrect Uσ to the
plant may lead to a disaster. For example, assume that V is the temperature of the boiler
and U is the opening of the fuel valve. In this system, the input ULV may correspond to
increasing of the fuel valve opening, while the inputs UNV or UHV may correspond to main-
taining or closing, respectively, of the fuel valve opening. Therefore, if the temperature is
actually High, but the sensor projects Low (due to an attack), an explosion may occur if the
fuel valve opening is further increased (when ULV is applied). Thus, to alleviate this prob-
lem, we synthesize the control input based on the estimated pmf, pˆ[V (0)], of the process
variable.
Specifically, define Udes as the expected value of Uσ with respect to the above pmf, i.e.,
Udes(n) = pˆ[V (0) = LV ]ULV (n) + pˆ[V (0) = NV ]UNV (n)
+pˆ[V (0) = HV ]UHV (n), n = 0, 1, ....
(4.10)
In the above control law, we utilize the pmf pˆ[V (0)], rather than the pmf pˆ[V (n)], for all
time n, since it is assumed that the dynamics of the attacker is much slower than that of the
closed loop system, implying that the sensor DQ, which is involved in the pˆ[V ] evaluation
(see Chapter II for details), remains the same. Furthermore, as it may be observed from
(4.10), if the entropy of pˆ[V (0)] is close to 0, the input Udes(n) is suitable for resilient
control; however, if the entropy of pˆ[V (0)] is close to 1, the input Udes(n) may steer the
process variable outside the safe domain. To overcome this problem, we define the resilient
control input as mentioned in (4.2), i.e., Ures(n) = ∆(n)Udes(n) + [1 −∆(n)]Usafe, where
0 ≤ ∆(n) ≤ 1, n = 0, 1, 2, ..., is the weighting factor, which reduces the aggressiveness of
Udes(n). The calculation of this weighting factor is described next.
4.2.3 Calculation of ∆
The goal here is to select ∆ such that Ures steers the process variable to Vdes in the steady
state, while ensuring that the process variable remains in [Vmin, Vmax] during the transients.
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To accomplish this, we predict the future values of the sub-plant states and the outputs,
under the input Ures, i.e.,
xˆσ,Ures(n+ i) = A
i
σxˆσ,Ures(n) +
i∑
k=1
Ai−kσ BσUres(n + k − 1),
xˆσ,Ures(0) = xσ(0),
Vˆσ,Ures(n+ i) = Cσxˆσ,Ures(n + i),
n = 0, 1, ..., i = 1, 2, ..., Np, σ ∈ {LV ,NV ,HV },
(4.11)
where Np is the duration period of the prediction, and, as before, the initial condition for
the prediction, xσ(0), is defined in (4.7). (The above expression is obtained as the solution
of the discrete-time LTI system (4.1).) As described below, the predicted values of the
process variable, Vˆσ,Ures , are involved in the previously mentioned optimization procedure,
which is used to compute ∆.
Based on the definition (4.2), this weighting factor ∆ can be considered as a parameter
of the input Ures, i.e.,
Ures(n) = Ures(n;∆(n)), n = 0, 1, .... (4.12)
Similarly, based on the prediction model (4.11), the ∆ can also be considered as a parameter
of the predicted process variable, i.e.,
Vˆσ,Ures(n+ 1) = Vˆσ,Ures(n+ 1;∆(n)), n = 0, 1, ..., σ ∈ {LV ,NV ,HV }. (4.13)
Clearly, if these predicted values, Vˆσ,Ures(n+1;∆(n)), Vˆσ,Ures(n+2;∆(n+1)), ..., Vˆσ,Ures(n+
Np;∆(n+Np − 1)), are required to approach and eventually track the desired value, Vdes,
the weights ∆(n),∆(n+ 1), ...,∆(n+Np− 1) must be selected appropriately. To accom-
plish this, introduce the following optimization problem, which, as mentioned before, is
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based on the ideas of model predictive control:
minimize
∆(n),∆(n+1),...,∆(n+Np−1)
Np∑
i=1
∑
σ=LV ,NV ,HV
1
2
Wσ
[
Vˆσ,Ures(n+ i;∆(n+ i− 1))− Vdes
]2
,
subject to Vmin ≤ Vˆσ,Ures(n+ i;∆(n+ i− 1)) ≤ Vmax,
n = 0, 1, ..., i = 1, ..., Np, σ ∈ {LV ,NV ,HV },
(4.14)
where Vˆσ,Ures is computed using (4.11). The Wσ’s, involved in the above penalty function,
are selected as
Wσ =
(
pˆ[V (0) = σ]
ǫW
)NW
, σ ∈ {LV ,NV ,HV }, (4.15)
where ǫW < 1 and NW ≥ 1 are design parameters. If NW is selected to be large, then Wσ
is small if pˆ[V (0) = σ] is small (i.e., pˆ[V (0) = σ] < ǫW ), and Wσ is large if pˆ[V (0) = σ] is
large (i.e., pˆ[V (0) = σ] > ǫW ). The duration period, Np, of the prediction must be selected
so that it is not too small, which makes the controller response oscillatory, nor too large,
which increases the computational complexity of the solution of (4.14).
We assume that the solution of the above problem, (4.14), is feasible for all time n (this
is termed as recursive or persistent feasibility, [62]). Given the solution ∆∗(n),∆∗(n +
1), ...,∆∗(n+Np−1), we utilize only∆∗(n) to computeUres(n), while ∆∗(n+1), ...,∆∗(n+
Np − 1) are discarded (as it is usual in model predictive control). Finally, this Ures(n) is
applied to the plant.
Since the actual states of the sub-plant cannot be observed, the stopping rule of the
above optimization procedure is selected as follows:
‖xˆσ,Ures(n + 1)− xˆσ,Ures(n)‖ < ǫstop, ∀σ ∈ {LV ,NV ,HV }, (4.16)
where ǫstop << 1 can be chosen as desired.
Given the control design described here, it may be important to characterize the stability
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of the closed loop system and the steady state value of the process variable (if it exists).
Assuming that this steady state exists, one of the possible ways to characterize the efficacy
of the resilient controller may be to evaluate the pmf of the process variable in the steady
state, denoted as pˆ[Vss], and determine under what conditions this pmf takes the largest
probability in the Normal status. While, in the current work, these issues are not addressed
for the case of dynamic plants, below we consider the case of static plants, and provide a
sufficient condition under which pˆ[Vss], indeed, takes the largest probability in the Normal
status.
4.2.4 Characterization of pˆ[Vss] properties
Consider the static sub-plant
xσ(n) = ασUres(n), xσ ∈ R, n = 0, 1, σ ∈ {LV ,NV ,HV },
Ures(0) = Usafe,
V˜ (n) = xσ(n), n = 0, 1, σ ∈ {LV ,NV ,HV },
(4.17)
where, as before, the process variable V˜ takes values in the interval [Vmin, Vmax], with the
sub-intervals [Vmin, R1), [R1, R2), and [R2, Vmax) specifying the Low, Normal, and High
domains, respectively. Denote the actual gain of the sub-plant as αact ∈ {αLV , αNV , αHV },
and define the sub-interval Iact as
Iact
(
V˜ (n)
)
:=


[Vmin, R1), if V˜ (n) ∈ [Vmin, R1),
[R1, R2), if V˜ (n) ∈ [R1, R2),
[R2, Vmax], if V˜ (n) ∈ [R2, Vmax],
n = 0, 1. (4.18)
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Assume that one sensor monitors the process variable, and let the sensor measurements be
represented by S˜. Further, assume that the model of the attacker is as follows:
S˜(n) = kaV˜ (n) + da, n = 0, 1, (4.19)
where ka and da are the gain and the bias, respectively, of the attacker. Based on the data
quality acquisition procedure, described in Chapter II, it can be shown that the sensor DQ
is a function of the above ka and da, i.e.,
DQ = DQ(ka, da). (4.20)
Introduce the following assumption:
Assumption IV.2. The attacker gain and bias are such that
kaUsafeαact + da ∈ Iact
(
V˜ (0)
)
. (4.21)

The implication of this assumption is as follows:
Lemma IV.2. Under Assumption IV.2, the actual and the estimated pmf’s of V at time
n = 0 take the maximum probability at the same status.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
The input Ures is calculated as described in Subsections 4.2.1-4.2.3. Clearly, the value
of this input at time n = 1, i.e., Ures(1), defines the pmf of V at time n = 1, i.e., p[V (1)].
(Note that since the plant is static, the process variable is in the steady state at n = 1. This
implies that the pmf p[Vss] is the same as the pmf p[V (1)].) Thus, to characterize p[Vss], we
have to compute pˆ[V (1)], and determine if it takes the maximum probability in the Normal
status. To accomplish that, introduce the following definition:
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Definition IV.1. The pmf pˆ[V (1)] is said to be the correct permutation of the pmf pˆ[V (0)]
if:
(i) both the pmf’s are comprised of the same probabilities;
(ii) the pmf pˆ[V (1)] takes the largest probability in the Normal status, irrespective of the
pmf pˆ[V (0)].

Since the sub-plant is considered to be static, select the parameter Np, involved in the
optimization problem (4.14), as 1. Further, for simplicity, assume that the parameter NW ,
also involved in (4.14), is selected as 1. Then,
Theorem IV.1. Under Assumption IV.2, the plant input Ures results in the pmf pˆ[V (1)],
which is the correct permutation of the pmf pˆ[V (0)], if
kaVdesαact
[
αLV +αNV +αHV +[3αact−αLV −αNV −αHV ]DQ(ka,da)
α2LV
+α2NV
+α2HV
+[3α2act−α
2
LV
−α2NV
−α2HV
]DQ(ka,da)
]
+ da ∈ [R1, R2). (4.22)
Proof. See the Appendix. 
This theorem implies that if ka and da are bounded, as characterized by the expressions
(4.21) and (4.22), then the resilient control input, indeed, ensures that the process variable
takes the Normal status with the maximum probability.
4.3 Example
While the previous section provided sufficient conditions for the efficacy of the developed
controller for static systems, in this section, we offer an example showing that the resilient
control system works for dynamic systems as well.
Assume that the sub-plant (4.1) is a first order system, i.e., q = 1. Further, assume that
the parameters involved in the sub-plant, the process variable, and the resilient controller
are as follows:
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• Sub-plant parameters:
– ALV = 0.9, BLV = 0.1, CLV = 1;
– ANV = 0.5, BNV = 0.75, CNV = 1;
– AHV = 0.67, BHV = 1, CHV = 1.
• Process variable parameters:
– Vmin = 1, Vmax = 200, R1 =
200
3
, R2 =
400
3
;
– Vdes = 100.
• Resilient controller parameters:
– Usafe = 50;
– K1,LV = 1.34, K2,LV = 3, K1,NV = −4, K2,NV = −0.134, K1,HV = 6,
K2,HV = 0.07;
– ǫW = 0.01, NW = 10, Np = 5.
Assume that the sub-plant is in the steady state if the following stopping rule is satisfied:
|xˆσ,Ures(n+ 1)− xˆσ,Ures(n)| < 10−4, ∀σ ∈ {LV ,NV ,HV }, (4.23)
and let Nss denote the time at which the above takes place. (Note that for all scenarios
considered below, Nss is determined to be less than 50sec.) As before, assume that the
attacker model is characterized by
S˜(n) = kaV˜ (n) + da, n = 0, 1, .... (4.24)
We evaluate the performance of the resilient controller under nine attack scenarios,
described in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. In these tables, the quantity ∆ is the average value of
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∆
∗(n), evaluated during the transients, i.e.,
∆ =
1
Nss
Nss−1∑
n=0
∆
∗(n), (4.25)
and the quantities ka, da, DQ, pˆ[V (0)], and pˆ[Vss] are the same as before. The ∆ is in-
troduced to characterize the aggressiveness of Ures in each of the scenarios considered. In
Scenarios 1 - 6, the value of da is fixed at 10, and the performance is evaluated for various
values of ka, whereas in Scenarios 7 - 9, the value of ka is fixed at 0.9, and the performance
is evaluated for various values of da. In all these scenarios, we assume that the actual sub-
plant status is Low.
As it may be observed from the above tables, the correct permutation of the pmf’s,
pˆ[Vss] and pˆ[V (0)], takes place in Scenarios 1,2,3,7, and 8. Clearly, in these scenarios, the
attacker’s modifications of the sensor measurements are relatively small, and, therefore, the
resulting pˆ[V (0)] contains a sufficient amount of information about the status of the pro-
cess variable (since DQ is close or equal to 1). This information is utilized by the resilient
controller to steer the process variable into the Normal domain (see Figure 4.2, where the
trajectories of V˜ and ∆∗ are illustrated for Scenario 3). Regarding Scenarios 4,5,6, and
9, it may be observed that the pmf’s pˆ[Vss] and pˆ[V (0)] are the same. Here, the attacker’s
modifications of the sensor measurements are relatively large, which results in pˆ[V (0)] not
containing a sufficient amount of information about the status of the process variable (since
DQ is relatively small). Thus, in these scenarios, the resilient control input is not aggres-
sive, which ensures that the process variable is maintained in the same domain, i.e., Low
(see Figure 4.3, where the trajectories of V˜ and ∆∗ are illustrated for Scenario 5).
Thus, the results obtained here indicate that the model predictive control-based ap-
proach to resilient feedback systems can be viewed as a potential solution of the resilient
control problem, and should be explored in more details in the future.
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Table 4.1: Performance of the resilient controller for Scenarios 1 - 6 (da = 10)
Scenario ka DQ pˆ[V (0)] pˆ[Vss] ∆
1 1 1 [1, 0, 0] [0, 1, 0] 1
2 0.95 0.97 [0.97, 0.015, 0.015] [0.015, 0.97, 0.015] 0.11
3 0.90 0.85 [0.9, 0.05, 0.05] [0.05, 0.9, 0.05] 0.12
4 0.85 0.70 [0.8, 0.1, 0.1] [0.8, 0.1, 0.1] 0.14
5 0.58 0.07 [0.38, 0.31, 0.31] [0.38, 0.31, 0.31] 0.06
6 0.50 0.02 [0.34, 0.33, 0.33] [0.34, 0.33, 0.33] 0
Table 4.2: Performance of the resilient controller for Scenarios 7 - 9 (ka = 0.9)
Scenario da DQ pˆ[V (0)] pˆ[Vss] ∆
7 15 0.85 [0.9, 0.05, 0.05] [0.05, 0.9, 0.05] 0.12
8 20 0.85 [0.9, 0.05, 0.05] [0.05, 0.9, 0.05] 0.12
9 25 ≈ 0 ≈ [1/3, 1/3, 1/3] ≈ [1/3, 1/3, 1/3] 0
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Figure 4.2: Trajectories of V˜ and ∆∗ for Scenario 3
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CHAPTER V
Actuator/Sensor Health Monitoring and Control Using
Synchronous Detection
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter IV, a resilient plant control input is synthesized using the information provided
by the resilient monitoring system. In the current chapter, we consider a different approach,
namely, the “nominal” feedback controller is modified based on the health assessment of
the sensors and actuators (which are assumed to be under attack). As mentioned before,
this health assessment is carried out using the method of synchronous detection, which is
widely applied in communication systems [2].
Resilient feedback systems, considered in this chapter, are feedback control systems
that are capable of identifying and mitigating malicious attacks on their sensors and actua-
tors, wherein the attacks are intended to force the plant output to deviate substantially from
the reference signal. In the absence of appropriate identification and mitigation strategies,
attacks may lead to unwanted consequences, such as damage to the plant. For example,
consider the drive system of a Uranium gas enrichment centrifuge, which typically con-
sists of a three-phase AC induction motor, a controller, and a speed sensor [63–67]. Since
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this system operates in a closed-loop configuration, an attack on the sensor that forces it to
project a ‘low’ speed may lead to the actual motor speed taking dangerously high values.
We assume that the attacker’s actions can be categorized as follows:
• Type 1 attack: The DC gain/s of the sensor or/and actuator is/are modified;
• Type 2 attack: A constant input is projected as an output of the sensor or/and actuator;
• Type 3 attack: A combination of the above two takes place, e.g., the DC gain of the
actuator is modified, while a constant input is projected as the output of the sensor.
To illustrate these types of attacks, consider the nominal (non-attacked) feedback control
system shown in Fig. 5.1, wherein K(s), A(s), P (s), and S(s) represent the transfer
functions of the controller, actuator, plant, and sensor, respectively, and S0 is the DC gain
of the sensor, i.e., S0 = lims→0 S(s). For this system, a Type 1 attack on the sensor is
Figure 5.1: Nominal system
depicted in Fig. 5.2, while a Type 2 attack on the actuator is shown in Fig. 5.3.
Given the above model of the attacker, our goal is to devise strategies to identify
Figure 5.2: Type 1 attack on the sensor, i.e., lims→0 Sa(s) 6= S0
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Figure 5.3: Type 2 attack on the actuator (attacker projects a constant input, ca)
malicious attacks on the control system and ensure that their effects are mitigated as quickly
as possible.
The development of the identification and mitigation procedures is carried out under
the following assumption:
Assumption V.1. a) The controller, plant, nominal actuator, and nominal sensor are open-
loop asymptotically stable, i.e., the poles of the transfer functions K(s), P (s), A(s),
and S(s) lie in the open left half plane.
b) The attacked actuator and the attacked sensor are open-loop asymptotically stable.
c) The nominal and the attacked closed-loop systems are asymptotically stable.

Under Assumption V.1, and as illustrated in Fig. 5.4, the approach to the identification
of attacks comprises of:
• Adding a sinusoidal signal to the reference;
• Multiplying the outputs of the actuator and the 1
S0
blocks by the same sinusoidal
signal;
• Computing the moving average of the signals resulting from the previous step.
Under the above procedure, the outputs of the moving average blocks, z1 and z2, are ana-
lyzed from the point of view of their consistency with the nominal values. As explained in
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Figure 5.4: Identification of attacks using synchronous detection
details in Section 5.2, attacks on the sensor and the actuator lead to z1 and z2 taking steady
state values that differ from their nominal ones, which gives rise to the identification of the
attacker’s actions.
Regarding the mitigation of attacks, this is based on the results of the identification pro-
cedure. Specifically, in the case of Type 1 attacks, the DC gains of the controller and the
1
S0
block are appropriately modified to ensure that the plant output is close to the reference
signal, whereas in the case of Type 2 or Type 3 attacks, operation of the closed loop system
is discontinued. These procedures are explained in details in Section 5.3.
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Note that if the attacker modifies the gains of the sensor and the actuator such that the
closed loop system is unstable, then the signals z1 and z2 do not attain the steady state. In
this situation, as before, the operation of the closed loop system is discontinued.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: As mentioned previously, the at-
tack identification and mitigation procedures are described in Sections 5.2 and 5.3, respec-
tively. Timing issues are analyzed in Section 5.4. Finally, an example of the application of
the developed procedures is presented in Section 5.5.
Figure 5.5: Identification of attacks using synchronous detection − Simplified case
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5.2 Attack Identification
The development of the techniques in this and the subsequent sections is carried out in
terms of the feedback control system shown in Fig. 5.5. The plant’s dynamics are assumed
to be characterized by the stable first order transfer function,
P (s) =
d
τs + 1
, (5.1)
where d is the DC gain and τ is the time constant. Further, the controller, sensor, and actu-
ator are assumed to be static, with their gains denoted as K, S, and A, respectively. Note
that these assumptions are made in order to simplify the presentation of the material, and
that the techniques developed here can be extended to more complex systems (e.g., higher
order plants, controllers with dynamics, etc.).
Given the above, the nominal steady state values of the signals z1 and z2 can be com-
puted as
z1,ss =
[
KA(1 +KAd + ω2τ 2)
ω2τ 2 + (1 +KAd)2
]
α2
2
, (5.2)
and
z2,ss =
[
KAd(1 +KAd)
ω2τ 2 + (1 +KAd)2
]
α2
2
, (5.3)
respectively. These values are used below to ascertain if an attack has indeed taken place
or not.
5.2.1 Identification of Type 1 attack
Assume that both the sensor and the actuator are under a Type 1 attack, i.e., the gains S and
A are modified as Sa > 0 and Aa > 0, respectively. Given this scenario, the steady state
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values of z1 and z2 can be computed as
z1,ss,a =
[
KAa(1+KAadSaS +ω
2τ2)
ω2τ2+(1+KAadSaS )
2
]
α2
2
,
z2,ss,a =
[
KAad
Sa
S (1+KAad
Sa
S )
ω2τ2+(1+KAadSaS )
2
]
α2
2
.
(5.4)
Using the above equations, the following expressions for Sa and Aa are obtained:
Sa = S
[
4z2,ss,a−α2+
√
(4z2,ss,a−α2)2−8z2,ss,a(1+ω2τ2)(2z2,ss,a−α2)
4z1,ss,ad
]
,
Aa =
2z1,ss,a
K[α2−2z2,ss,a]
.
(5.5)
These expressions are utilized in Section 5.3 to mitigate the effects of Type 1 attacks.
5.2.2 Identification of Type 2 attack
Assuming that a Type 2 attack takes place on the sensor, i.e., a constant input, ca, is pro-
jected by the attacker, the steady state values of z1 and z2 can be computed as
z1,ss,a = KA
α2
2
, z2,ss,a = 0. (5.6)
Similarly, under a Type 2 attack on the actuator, we have
z1,ss,a = z2,ss,a = 0. (5.7)
The above expression also applies for the case of simultaneous Type 2 attacks on both the
sensor and the actuator.
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5.2.3 Identification of Type 3 attack
Assume that a Type 1 attack takes place on the actuator, while a Type 2 attack takes place
on the sensor. In this scenario,
z1,ss,a = KAa
α2
2
, z2,ss,a = 0. (5.8)
Suppose that a Type 2 attack takes place on the actuator, while a Type 1 attack takes
place on the sensor. Then,
z1,ss,a = z2,ss,a = 0. (5.9)
Clearly, under attack, the steady state values of the z’s are different from the nominal
ones. These results are summarized in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Steady state values of z1 and z2 under various scenarios
Scenario\Signal z1,ss z2,ss
Nominal
[
KA(1+KAd+ω2τ2)
ω2τ2+(1+KAd)2
]
α2
2
[
KAd(1+KAd)
ω2τ2+(1+KAd)2
]
α2
2
system
Type 1 attack
[
KAa(1+KAadSaS +ω2τ2)
ω2τ2+(1+KAadSaS )
2
]
α2
2
[
KAad
Sa
S (1+KAad
Sa
S )
ω2τ2+(1+KAadSaS )
2
]
α2
2
on S and A
Type 2 attack on S KAα2
2
0
Type 2 attack on A 0 0
Type 2 attack 0 0
on S and A
Type 3 attack: KAa α
2
2
0
Type 2 attack on S and
Type 1 attack on A
Type 3 attack: 0 0
Type 1 attack on S and
Type 2 attack on A
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5.3 Attack Mitigation
5.3.1 Mitigation of Type 1 attack
As described in Section 5.2, under a simultaneous Type 1 attack on both the sensor and the
actuator, the steady state values of the signals z1 and z2 can be used to calculate the values
of the gains Sa and Aa. These, in turn, are utilized to compensate for the effects of the
attack by modifying the controller K as K A
Aa
and the 1
S
block as 1
Sa
(see Fig. 5.6).
Figure 5.6: Mitigation of Type 1 attack on the sensor and the actuator
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5.3.2 Mitigation of Type 2 or Type 3 attack
In the case of either Type 2 or Type 3 attack, it is clear that the feedback loop is disconnected
by the attacker. Therefore, this leaves us with no alternative but to discontinue operation
of the control system. Normal operation may resume after the attacked component/s is/are
either repaired or replaced.
5.4 Timing Issues
In some applications, there may exist a ‘critical’ time duration, Tc, beyond which it is un-
desirable for the plant output to be substantially different from the reference. Obviously, it
is necessary that the time required to complete the identification and mitigation procedures
be less than Tc. Below, we examine the duration of the former under the various types of
attacks.
In the case of a Type 1 attack, the transient response of the resilient control system can
be partitioned into the following three time intervals:
• Time required for the plant output to go close to the new steady state value, after the
attack takes place;
• Time required to calculate the new steady state values of z1 and z2, after the above
takes place;
• Time required for the plant output to go close to the reference signal, after the iden-
tification and mitigation procedures are applied.
We assume that the duration of the first time interval is 3τ , where τ is the time constant
of the plant transfer function. As for the second time interval, its duration is T , where T
is the time period of the sinusoidal oscillations. Finally, we assume, as before, that the
duration of the third time interval is 3τ . Thus, the time, Tidm, required to identify and
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mitigate a Type 1 attack is
Tidm = 6τ + T. (5.10)
Clearly, from the above expression, it is advantageous to choose T as small as possible.
However, as explained below, an arbitrarily small T (or arbitrarily large ω) makes it difficult
to detect the attack.
Assume that a Type 1 attack takes place on the sensor. Define ∆z1 and ∆z2 as
∆z1 := |z1,ss − z1,ss,a|, ∆z2 := |z2,ss − z2,ss,a|, (5.11)
and consider, for example, the plot of ∆z2 versus ωτ , shown in Fig. 5.7. As seen in this
figure, it is not desirable to select ω large for plants with large τ , since the value of ∆z2
would be small, hence making it difficult to distinguish between the nominal and attacked
scenarios. The underlying reason for this phenomenon is that the plant filters out the high
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Figure 5.7: ∆z2 vs. ωτ under a Type 1 attack on the sensor
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frequency sinusoidal signal. Thus, there exists a tradeoff between the choice of frequency
of the sinusoidal signal and the difficulty of identifying the attack.
Under a Type 2 attack, since operation of the feedback control system is discontinued
after the identification procedure is completed, Tidm is given by
Tidm = 3τ + T. (5.12)
The above expression applies to the case of a Type 3 attack as well.
To summarize this section, we note that the identification and mitigation procedures
developed in this work are effective if Tidm < Tc.
5.5 Example: Application to Uranium Enrichment Centrifuge Con-
trol System
Consider a three-phase induction motor, whose transfer function between the input voltage
and the rotational speed is given by (see [64]):
P (s) =
157
4s+ 1
. (5.13)
Assume that this motor is operated in the closed-loop configuration of Fig. 5.5, with the
parameters specified in Table 5.2. Further, assume that an attacker conducts a Type 1 attack
on the sensor, with the parameters of the attack provided in Table 5.3. Given these data, the
nominal steady state values of z1 and z2 can be computed as
z1,ss = 52, z2,ss = 311. (5.14)
Similarly, the steady state values of z1 and z2 under the attack can be calculated as
z1,ss,a = 203, z2,ss,a = 307. (5.15)
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The trajectories of the plant output, y, are illustrated in Fig. 5.8. As seen in this figure,
y deviates from the reference signal, r, after the attack takes place at time t = 15sec. As
described in Section 5.4, the time required by y to reach the new steady state is 3τ = 12sec.
Further, a duration of T = 0.06sec is required to calculate the new steady state values of
Table 5.2: Parameters of the control system
Gains of controller, actuator, and sensor K = 20, A = 2, S = 1
Value of reference signal r = 528
Amplitude and frequency of sinusoidal signal α = 25, ω = 100
Table 5.3: Parameters of the attack
Attacked DC gain of sensor Sa = 0.5
Time of attack 15sec
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Figure 5.8: Trajectory of the plant output, y
the z’s and identify the attack. Thus, the attack is identified at t = 15+3τ +T = 27.06sec.
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The application of the mitigation procedure at t = 27.06sec causes y to begin approach-
ing the reference signal. Finally, after a further 12sec, normal operation of the plant is
achieved (at t = 39.06sec).
The zoomed trajectories of z1 and z2, in the vicinity of t = 15sec, are illustrated in Fig.
5.9. The trends of these trajectories can be explained as above.
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Figure 5.9: Zoomed trajectories of z1 and z2, shown in the vicinity of t = 15sec
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CHAPTER VI
Conclusions and Future Research
6.1 Summary of Results Obtained To-Date
This work designs, analyzes, and evaluates the performance of resilient monitoring and
control systems. A brief summary of the key results obtained to-date are as follows:
The development of the resilient monitoring system (RMS) is carried out based on
the following five techniques: Data quality acquisition, process variable assessment, plant
condition evaluation, sensor network adaptation, and decentralized assessments with infer-
ences, a.k.a., knowledge fusion. Each of these techniques are analyzed rigorously, and are
used to design a five-layer RMS architecture. The performance of the resulting RMS is
evaluated using a power plant application.
The development of the resilient control system (RCS) is carried out using two differ-
ent approaches: The model predictive control (MPC) -based approach and the synchronous
detection (SD) -based approach. Initial investigations into these approaches show that both
of them may be viable for the design of RCS.
Numerous research problems, however, remain open. They are outlined below:
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6.2 Problems in Resilient Monitoring Systems
• Problems related to data quality acquisition:
– Investigating efficacy of the probe-based data quality acquisition technique for
attackers other than those modifying the expected value of sensor measure-
ments.
– Improving temporal properties of DQ acquisition. As shown in Chapter II,
DQ is acquired in about 5sec. It would be desirable to achieve this an order
of magnitude faster. A potential approach is inferring DQ from the transient,
rather than the steady state, response of a process variable to the probe.
– Introducing and investigating other than probe-basedDQ acquisition techniques.
Perhaps, this could be accomplished by considering inference diagrams of pro-
cess variables and continually monitoring the level of their satisfaction in the
data provided by the sensors.
– Investigating the possibility of assigningDQ based on a reputation fusion mech-
anism. Reference [68] introduced a framework for assigning a “reputation” to
each sensor Si, based on the Dempster-Shafer combination of the individual
reputations assigned to Si by several neighboring sensors. Is there a way to
integrate the probe-based technique within the above framework? If so, would
the resulting DQ of the sensor be more representative of its actual condition −
attacked or operating normally?
• Problems related to process variable assessment:
– Introducing and investigating different than (2.12) models of coupling between
the sensor data and process variables. Similarly, investigating different (as com-
pared with the believability (2.11)) effects of DQ on process variable assess-
ment.
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– In the current work, the sensor data and DQ’s are utilized to assess the process
variable pmf’s (i.e., h-procedure (2.15), (2.16)) under the assumption that the
state of the sensor network remains constant. Are there convergent techniques
to accomplish this when the state of the sensor network is non-stationary? If so,
the temporal properties of the RMS could be improved substantially.
• Problems related to sensor network adaptation:
– Utilizing other than (2.42) rational controllers. The goal here is to devise ra-
tional controllers with faster adaptation rates (see [7] where various types of
rational controllers are introduced and analyzed).
– Introducing and analyzing other than entropy-based penalty functions. Perhaps,
there exists a penalty function that would lead to lower uncertainty in process
variable assessment than the entropy.
– Investigating a possibility of associating a rational controller with each sensor
of the sensor network. Although this would lead to a non-stationary adaptation
environment, it would result, if convergent, in a substantial improvement of
adaptation rates.
• Problems related to decentralized assessments with inferences:
– Deriving necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimality of decentralized
inferences. At present, only sufficient conditions for the optimality are available
(see Chapter III). Do there exist both necessary and sufficient conditions that
guarantee the optimality of decentralized inferences?
– Characterizing the monotonicity of the Dempster-Shafer combination rule. The
conditions for lossless decentralization (derived in Chapter III) involve the as-
sumption that the Dempster-Shafer rule is monotonic on the set of process vari-
able pmf’s. However, no constructive methods are currently available to verify
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if this assumption holds. Developing such methods to verify the monotonicity
is an important problem.
• Problem related to plant assessment:
– Investigating a possibility of recursive plant assessment. Because recursive ap-
plication of the Jeffrey rule may lead to paradoxical results (see Chapter II),
in the current work we apply this rule non-recursively, which slows down the
plant pmf assessment. So, modifying this rule or developing a new one, which
would permit a recursive application, is an important problem.
6.3 Problems in Resilient Control Systems
These problems are divided into two categories: Problems related to the MPC-based ap-
proach and problems related to the SD-based approach. They are listed below:
Problems related to MPC-based approach:
• Evaluating the controller from the point of view of stability and performance (e.g.,
reference tracking and disturbance rejection). Is the closed loop system stable? Is
the RCS effective at rejecting disturbances? These are important questions to be
addressed.
• Extending the theory to more complex plants, e.g., MIMO plants. At present, the
theory is under development for SISO plants. Extending the development to more
complex plants is an important problem.
• Application of the approach developed to the power plant model considered in Chap-
ter II.
Problems related to SD-based approach:
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• Application of the developed techniques to models of power plants and power grids.
Solutions of these problems will enable designing effective resilient monitoring and
control systems for critical infrastructures (e.g., chemical plants, power systems and power
grids, computer networks, civil engineering objects) and complex individual plants (e.g.,
aircraft and space structures).
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APPENDIX A
Proofs of Theorems Stated in Chapter II
A.1 Proof of Theorem II.1, Part 1
The proof consists of the following five steps:
Step 1: Calculate the expected value of the set point h∗σ(sn+1), σ ∈ ΣV :
Since the sensor measurements are stationary, the expected value of h∗σ(sn+1), σ ∈ ΣV ,
is independent of n ∈ N, and can be denoted as E {h∗σ(sn+1)} = µh∗σ , σ ∈ ΣV . This
quantity is calculated from (2.16) in the following manner:
µh
∗
σ = βS · p[S = σ] +
1− βS
|ΣV | − 1 {1− p[S = σ]} , σ ∈ ΣV . (A.1)
Then, from (2.11),
µh
∗
σ = DQS · p[S = σ] +
1−DQS
|ΣV | , σ ∈ ΣV . (A.2)
Step 2: Evaluate lim
n→∞
E {hσ(n)}, σ ∈ ΣV :
First, using (2.15), express hσ(n), σ ∈ ΣV , in terms of the initial condition, hσ(0),
88
σ ∈ ΣV , and the sequence of set points, h∗σ(sn), n = 1, 2, ..., n, σ ∈ ΣV , as follows:
hσ(n) = (1− ǫh)nhσ(0) + ǫh
n∑
i=1
(1− ǫh)n−ih∗σ(si), σ ∈ ΣV , (A.3)
where 0 < ǫh << 1 is the step of the h-procedure. Next, take the expected value of both
sides of (A.3) to obtain
E {hσ(n)} = (1− ǫh)nhσ(0) + µh∗σ ǫh
n∑
i=1
(1− ǫh)n−i, σ ∈ ΣV ,
= (1− ǫh)nhσ(0)
+µh
∗
σ ǫh (1 + 1− ǫh + (1− ǫh)2 + ...+ (1− ǫh)n−1) , σ ∈ ΣV .
(A.4)
Using the fact that ǫh < 1, it can be shown that the limit of (A.4) as n→∞ is given by
lim
n→∞
E {hσ(n)} = µh∗σ ǫh 11−(1−ǫh) , σ ∈ ΣV ,
= µh
∗
σ , σ ∈ ΣV .
(A.5)
Step 3: Evaluate lim
n→∞
E
{
h2σ(n)
}
, σ ∈ ΣV :
Using (A.3), we obtain
{hσ(n)}2 =
(
(1− ǫh)nhσ(0) + ǫh
n∑
i=1
(1− ǫh)n−ih∗σ(si)
)2
, σ ∈ ΣV ,
= (1− ǫh)2nh2σ(0) + ǫ2h
(
n∑
i=1
(1− ǫh)n−ih∗σ(si)
)2
+2(1− ǫh)nǫhhσ(0)
n∑
i=1
(1− ǫh)n−ih∗σ(si), σ ∈ ΣV .
(A.6)
Taking the expected value of both sides of (A.6), and applying the limit as n → ∞, we
obtain
lim
n→∞
E
{
h2σ(n)
}
= lim
n→∞
ǫ2hE


(
n∑
i=1
(1− ǫh)n−ih∗σ(si)
)2
 , σ ∈ ΣV . (A.7)
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Further, (A.7) can be rewritten as
lim
n→∞
E
{
h2σ(n)
}
= lim
n→∞
{
ǫ2h[v
h∗
σ − (µh
∗
σ )
2]
1− (1− ǫh)2n
1− (1− ǫh)2
+(µh
∗
σ )
2[1− (1− ǫh)n]2
}
, σ ∈ ΣV ,
(A.8)
where vh∗σ , σ ∈ ΣV , denotes the second moment of h∗σ(sn), σ ∈ ΣV , i.e., vh∗σ := E
{
[h∗σ(sn)]
2}
,
∀n, σ ∈ ΣV . The limit in (A.8) is evaluated as
lim
n→∞
E
{
h2σ(n)
}
= [vh
∗
σ − (µh∗σ )2] ǫ
2
h
1−(1−ǫh)2
+ (µh
∗
σ )
2, σ ∈ ΣV . (A.9)
Since ǫ
2
h
1−(1−ǫh)2
= ǫh
2−ǫh
and ǫh is sufficiently small, we have ǫh2−ǫh ≈ 0. Therefore,
lim
n→∞
E
{
h2σ(n)
} ≈ (µh∗σ )2, σ ∈ ΣV . (A.10)
Step 4: Evaluate lim
n→∞
E
{(
hσ(n)− µh∗σ
)2}
, σ ∈ ΣV :
This quantity can be expressed as lim
n→∞
E
{
h2σ(n)− (µh
∗
σ )
2
}
, σ ∈ ΣV , which, from
(A.10), is close to zero. Therefore,
lim
n→∞
E
{(
hσ(n)− µh∗σ
)2} ≈ 0, σ ∈ ΣV . (A.11)
Step 5: Use Chebyshev’s inequality to obtain the desired result:
From Chebyshev’s inequality,
lim
n→∞
P
(∣∣hσ(n)− µh∗σ ∣∣ > α) < lim
n→∞
E
{(
hσ(n)− µh∗σ
)2}
α2
, ∀α > 0, σ ∈ ΣV . (A.12)
From (A.11), we can conclude that the right hand side of (A.12) is close to zero. Therefore,
lim
n→∞
P
(∣∣hσ(n)− µh∗σ ∣∣ > α) ≈ 0, ∀α > 0, σ ∈ ΣV . Moreover, if the recursive state,
hσ(n), σ ∈ ΣV , is expressed as hσ(n; ǫh), σ ∈ ΣV , where ǫh is treated as a parameter, the
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following can be concluded using the steps described above:
lim
ǫh→0
lim
n→∞
P
(∣∣hσ(n; ǫh)− µh∗σ ∣∣ > α) = 0, ∀α > 0, σ ∈ ΣV . (A.13)
This completes the proof of Part 1 of Theorem II.1. 
A.2 Proof of Theorem II.1, Part 2
The proof is based on the following three lemmas:
Lemma A.1. Consider the recursive procedure (2.15), (2.16), (2.18). Then,
0 ≤ lim
n→∞
hσ(n) ≤ 1, σ ∈ ΣV . (A.14)
Proof. As it follows from (2.15),
hσ(n) = w0(n)hσ(0) +
n∑
i=1
wi(n)h
∗
σ(si), σ ∈ ΣV ,
w0(n) :=
n∏
i=1
[1− ǫh(i− 1)], wi(n) := ǫh(i− 1)
n−1∏
j=i
[1− ǫh(j)], i = 1, 2, ..., n.
(A.15)
Thus, hσ(n) ≥ 0, ∀n and ∀σ. Also, it can be shown that, due to (2.18),
n∑
i=0
wi(n) = 1, lim
n→∞
w0(n) = 0. (A.16)
Therefore,
lim
n→∞
hσ(n) = lim
n→∞
w0(n)hσ(0) + lim
n→∞
n∑
i=1
wi(n)h
∗
σ(si), σ ∈ ΣV ,
= lim
n→∞
n∑
i=1
wi(n)h
∗
σ(si) ≤ lim
n→∞
n∑
i=1
wi(n), σ ∈ ΣV ,
(A.17)
where the last inequality is due to (2.16). Finally, in view of (A.16), this inequality becomes
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limn→∞ hσ(n) ≤ limn→∞[1− w0(n)] = 1, σ ∈ ΣV . 
Lemma A.2. Under the assumptions of Theorem II.1, the expected value of the set point,
h∗σ(sn), σ ∈ ΣV , n ∈ N, is given by
E[h∗σ(sn)] = p[S = σ]DQS +
1−DQS
|ΣV | , σ ∈ ΣV , n ∈ N. (A.18)
Proof. Follows directly from (2.16). 
Thus, according to this lemma, the expected value of h∗σ(sn) is independent of n ∈ N,
and can be denoted as E[h∗σ(sn)] = µh∗σ , σ ∈ ΣV .
To formulate the next lemma, introduce the function
f (hσ(n)) :=
1
2
[h∗σ(sn+1)− hσ(n)]2 , σ ∈ ΣV . (A.19)
Lemma A.3. The unique minimum of E [f (hσ(n))], σ ∈ ΣV , is attained at
arg min
hσ(n)
E [f (hσ(n))] = µh∗σ , σ ∈ ΣV . (A.20)
Proof. Clearly,E [f (hσ(n))] is differentiable and convex in hσ(n) and, therefore, its unique
minimum is attained at
∂
∂hσ(n)
E [f (hσ(n))] = 0, σ ∈ ΣV . (A.21)
Due to (A.19), this expression becomes hσ(n) − µh∗σ = 0, implying that for any fixed
n ∈ N, the solution of the minimization problem is hminσ (n) = µh∗σ , σ ∈ ΣV . 
Proof of Theorem II.1, Part 2: The proof is based on showing that for large n, the
recursive procedure (2.15), (2.16), (2.18) solves the aforementioned minimization problem,
and, therefore, hσ(n) converges to µh∗σ , σ ∈ ΣV , almost surely.
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Since f (hσ(n)), σ ∈ ΣV , is continuously differentiable and convex, there exists a
scalar 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 such that
f (hσ(n+ 1)) = f (hσ(n)) + [hσ(n + 1)− hσ(n)] ∂f∂hσ(n)
∣∣∣
hσ(n)=hσ(n)
+ [hσ(n+1)−hσ(n)]
2
2
∂2f
∂h2σ(n)
∣∣∣
hσ(n)=hσ(n)+γ[hσ(n+1)−hσ(n)]
, σ ∈ ΣV .
(A.22)
From (A.19) and (2.15), (2.16), we obtain
f (hσ(n+ 1)) = f (hσ(n))− ǫh(n)
[
∂f
∂hσ(n)
]2
+
ǫ2
h
(n)
2
[h∗σ(sn+1)− hσ(n)]2, σ ∈ ΣV .
(A.23)
Using the summation of both sides of (A.23), we obtain:
f (hσ(n)) = f (hσ(0))−
n−1∑
n=0
ǫh(n)
[
∂f
∂hσ(n)
]2
+
n−1∑
n=0
ǫ2h(n)
2
[h∗σ(sn+1)− hσ(n)]2, σ ∈ ΣV .
(A.24)
Now, consider the limit of (A.24) as n → ∞. Since hσ(n) is bounded for all n (see
Lemma A.1), the left hand side of the above equation is a finite positive number. Due to the
same reason, the term [h∗σ(sn+1)− hσ(n)]2 is bounded for all n, implying that there exists
a positive K, such that [h∗σ(sn+1)− hσ(n)]2 ≤ K, ∀n. Thus,
lim
n→∞
f (hσ(n)) ≤ f (hσ(0))− lim
n→∞
n−1∑
n=0
ǫh(n)
[
∂f
∂hσ(n)
]2
+K
2
lim
n→∞
n−1∑
n=0
ǫ2h(n), σ ∈ ΣV .
(A.25)
Observe that since
∑∞
n=0 ǫ
2
h(n) < ∞, the last term in the right hand side of (A.25) is
bounded. Now, suppose ∂f
∂hσ(n)
does not go to 0 as n tends to ∞. Then the expression∑∞
n=0 ǫh(n)
[
∂f
∂hσ(n)
]2
is unbounded (due to ∑∞n=0 ǫh(n) = ∞) and the right hand side
of (A.25) becomes −∞. This is a contradiction, since the left hand side is positive and
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bounded. Therefore, ∂f
∂hσ(n)
→ 0 as n→∞ almost surely (a.s.).
From the above arguments, E
[
∂f
∂hσ(n)
]
→ 0 as n → ∞. Furthermore, due to the
linearity of expectation, ∂
∂hσ(n)
E[f(hσ(n))] → 0 as n → ∞, implying that the condition
(A.21) is satisfied. Therefore, from Lemma A.3, it is clear that limn→∞ hσ(n) = µh∗σ , σ ∈
ΣV , a.s. Finally, using Lemma A.2, we conclude that limn→∞ hσ(n) = p[S = σ]DQS +
1−DQS
|ΣV |
, σ ∈ ΣV , a.s. 
A.3 Proof of Theorem II.2
Since hσ(n) is convergent a.s., for every ǫ, there exists n0(ǫ), such that P
[|hNV (n)− hssNV |
< ǫ] > 1 − ǫ, ∀n > n0(ǫ). Therefore, for sufficiently large n, equation (2.40) can be
rewritten as
kNG(n+ 1) = F (kNG(n)) +O(ǫ), (A.26)
where
F (kNG(n)) :=
[
ahssNV
akNG(n)+[1−a][1−kNG (n)]
+
[1−a][1−hssNV
]
[1−a]kNG(n)+a[1−kNG (n)]
]
kNG(n),
and O(ǫ) represents terms of order ǫ. Omitting these terms, equation (A.26) is approxi-
mated as
kNG(n + 1) = F (kNG(n)) . (A.27)
It can be shown that the system (A.27) has three equilibria,
k∗NG = 1, k
∗∗
NG
= 0, k∗∗∗NG =
hssNV − a
1− 2a . (A.28)
Based on the perturbation theory ([69]), for ǫ sufficiently small, stability properties of
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(A.27) are the same as (A.26). To analyze stability, consider the Jacobians of F (·) at
each equilibrium:
A1 =
∂F
∂kNG
∣∣∣
k∗NG
=
[1−a]2+[2a−1]hssNV
a[1−a]
, A2 =
∂F
∂kNG
∣∣∣
k∗∗NG
=
a2+[1−2a]hssNV
a[1−a]
,
A3 =
∂F
∂kNG
∣∣∣
k∗∗∗NG
= a[1−a]
hssNV
[1−hssNV
]
.
(A.29)
Suppose hssNV > 1 − a. Since 0 < a < 0.5, we have A1 < 1, A2 > 1, and A3 > 1,
implying that k∗NG is asymptotically stable, while k
∗∗
NG
and k∗∗∗NG are not. Therefore, kNG(n)
converges locally to k∗NG as n→∞, which proves Part 1 of the theorem. Parts 2 and 3 can
be proved similarly. 
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APPENDIX B
Parameters of Simulations Reported in Chapter II
B.1 Parameters of power plant and monitoring system
This subsection provides parameters of the power plant and monitoring system that have
been used in simulations reported in Subsection 2.8.2. Note that these parameters are se-
lected for illustration purposes and do not reflect the physical nature of the quantities in-
volved.
B.1.1 Sub-plants, process variables, and sensors
B.1.1.1 Statistical models of the sub-plants
As mentioned in Subsection 2.8.1, these models are defined by conditional probabilities of
process variables given the status of a sub-plant Gi ∈ {NGi ,AGi}, i ∈ {B,HT,RP,LT}.
Accordingly, we quantify these models as follows:
• Boiler: P [V1 = NV1 |GB = NGB ] = P [V1 = LV1 |GB = AGB ] = 0.95; all other
components of this pmf are 0.05.
• High pressure turbine: P [V2 ∈ {L(1)V2 ,NV2}|GHT = NGHT ] = 0.90,
P [V2 ∈ {VLV2 ,L(2)V2}|GHT = AGHT ] = 0.90; all other components are 0.1.
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• Reheat pipe: P [V3 ∈ {L(1)V3 ,NV3}|GRP = NGRP ] = 0.88,
P [V3 ∈ {VLV3 ,L(2)V3}|GRP = AGRP ] = 0.91, P [V3 ∈ {VLV3 ,L(2)V3}|GRP =
NGRP ] = 0.12, and P [V3 ∈ {L(1)V3 ,NV3}|GRP = AGRP ] = 0.09.
• Low pressure turbine: P [V4 ∈ {VL(1)V4 ,L(1)V4 ,M(1)V4 ,NV4}|GLT = NGLT ] = 0.91,
P [V4 ∈ {VL(2)V4 , L(2)V4 ,M(2)V4 ,HV4}|GLT = AGLT ] = 0.92,
P [V4 ∈ {VL(2)V4 ,L(2)V4 ,M(2)V4 ,HV4} |GLT = NGLT ] = 0.09, and
P [V4 ∈ {VL(1)V4 ,L(1)V4 ,M(1)V4 ,NV4}|GLT = AGLT ] = 0.08.
B.1.1.2 Models of process variables and sensors
The domains of the process variables and their d.c. gains are specified in Table B.1.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the process variables and the sensor measure-
Table B.1: Domains and d.c. gains of process variables
Process variables Domains Values of R’s (see (2.2)) d.c. gains (see (2.3))
V˜1 [5, 100] R1 = 50 α
L
V1 = 2, α
N
V1 = 2.2.
V˜2 [5, 25] R1 = 10, R2 = 15, R3 = 20
αVLV2 = 0.5, α
L1
V2 = 0.6,
αL2V2 = 0.7, α
N
V2 = 0.8.
V˜3 [5, 100] R1 = 20, R2 = 40, R3 = 50
αVLV3 = 0.6, α
L(1)
V3 = 0.72,
α
L(2)
V3 = 0.9, α
N
V3 = 1.2.
V˜4 [0.1, 20]
R1 = 3, R2 = 6, α
VL(1)
V4 = 0.4, α
VL(2)
V4 = 0.42,
R3 = 9, R4 = 11, α
L(1)
V4 = 0.46, α
L(2)
V4 = 0.48,
R5 = 13, R6 = 15, α
M(1)
V4 = 0.53, α
M(2)
V4 = 0.56,
R7 = 17. α
N
V4 = 0.6, α
H
V4 = 0.63.
ments are Gaussian random variables, V˜i ∼ N
(
µV˜i, σV˜i
)
and S˜ij ∼ N
(
µS˜ij , σS˜ij
)
,
i = 1, 2, 3, 4, j = 1, 2, where the expected values, µV˜i and µS˜ij , are specified in Tables
B.2 and B.3, respectively, for all attack scenarios considered in Section 2.8. Regarding the
standard deviations of V˜i and S˜ij , we assume that they are small enough so that the realiza-
tions of these random variables outside of the domains given in Table B.1 may be ignored.
Specifically, they are selected as σV˜i = σS˜ij = 0.01, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, j = 1, 2.
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Table B.2: Expected values of process variables
Attack scenario µV˜1 µV˜2 µV˜3 µV˜4
1 80 23 75 16
2 80 23 75 16
3 80 23 44 12.1
4 80 18 76 16
5 30 12 23 10
6 30 12 15 5
7 20 7 10 5
Table B.3: Expected values of sensor measurements
Attack scenario µS˜11 µS˜12 µS˜21 µS˜22 µS˜31 µS˜32 µS˜41 µS˜42
1 31 30 22 24 74 74.1 15.8 16.1
2 81 79 22 24 74 74.1 19.2 19.1
3 81 79 22 24 74 74.1 12.2 12.1
4 81 79 22 24 74 74.1 16.1 16.2
5 81 79 12.1 12.2 23 24 16.1 16.2
6 81 79 12.1 12.2 76 75 16.1 16.2
7 81 79 23 22 76 75 16.1 16.2
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B.1.2 Parameters of monitoring system
B.1.2.1 Data quality assessment layer
• The amplitudes of the probing signals (2.6) are selected as follows: AV1 = 2, AV2 =
0.6, AV3 = 0.7, and AV4 = 0.3.
• The parameter ǫ, involved in (2.10), is selected as 0.02.
• The PICmax in (2.10) for the sensors of B, HT, RP, and LT are 0.4, 0.06, 0.08, 0.03,
respectively.
B.1.2.2 Process variables assessment layer
• The step size of the h-procedure (2.15) is selected as ǫh = 0.01.
• The stopping rule is defined by |hσ(n + 1)− hσ(n)| < 10−4.
B.1.2.3 Adaptation layer
The parameters involved in (2.42) are selected as follows:
• The level of rationality of the rational controller is selected as N = 2.
• The maximum residence time is selected as Tmax = 1sec.
• The parameter β is chosen as 0.04.
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APPENDIX C
Proofs of Lemmas and Theorems Stated in Chapter III
C.1 Proof of Lemma III.1
The proof of Lemma III.1 requires the following notations: Let nj , j = 1, 2, ...,M , be the
cardinality of ΣVj , j = 1, 2, ...,M , i.e.,
nj := |ΣVj |, j = 1, 2, ...,M. (C.1)
Further, let the pmf pˆyj [Vj ], yj ∈ Yj , j = 1, 2, ...,M , be represented as the column vector
qyj ,Vj ∈ Rnj , j = 1, 2, ...,M , i.e.,
pˆyj [Vj ] = qyj ,Vj := [q
(1)
yj ,Vj
, q
(2)
yj ,Vj
, · · · , q(nj)yj ,Vj ]⊤, yj ∈ Yj, j = 1, 2, ...,M, (C.2)
where 0 ≤ q(1)yj ,Vj , q
(2)
yj ,Vj
, ..., q
(nj)
yj ,Vj
≤ 1 and q(1)yj ,Vj + q
(2)
yj ,Vj
+ ... + q
(nj)
yj ,Vj
= 1, yj ∈ Yj ,
j = 1, 2, ...,M . The inferred pmf, pˆyj [Vi], yj ∈ Yj , i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2, ...,M , is computed,
as before, using the total probability formula, i.e.,
pˆyj [Vi] =
∑
σ∈ΣVj
P [Vi|Vj = σ]pˆyj [Vj = σ], yj ∈ Yj, i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2, ...,M, (C.3)
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and can be similarly represented as the column vector qyj ,Vi ∈ Rni , i 6= j, i, j =
1, 2, ...,M :
pˆyj [Vi] = qyj ,Vi := [q
(1)
yj ,Vi
, q
(2)
yj ,Vi
, · · · , q(ni)yj ,Vi ]⊤, yj ∈ Yj, i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2, ...,M, (C.4)
where 0 ≤ q(1)yj ,Vi, q
(2)
yj ,Vi
, ..., q
(ni)
yj ,Vi
≤ 1 and q(1)yj ,Vi + q
(2)
yj ,Vi
+ ... + q
(ni)
yj ,Vi
= 1, i 6= j, i, j =
1, 2, ...,M .
As assumed in Assumption III.1, the 2-norms of the columns of the matrix P [Vi|Vj], i 6=
j, i, j = 1, 2, ...,M , are equal. Let the value of these 2-norms be denoted as KVi|Vj , i 6= j,
i, j = 1, 2, ....,M , i.e.,
KVi|Vj := ‖p(1)Vi|Vj‖2 = ‖p
(2)
Vi|Vj
‖2 = · · · = ‖p(nj)Vi|Vj‖2, i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2, ...,M. (C.5)
Similarly, as assumed in Assumption III.1, the angles between all pairs of columns of
P [Vi|Vj], i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2, ...,M , are equal. Let the value of these angles be denoted as
θVi|Vj , i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2, ....,M , i.e.,
cos θVi|Vj :=
〈p(1)
Vi|Vj
,p
(2)
Vi|Vj
〉
K2
Vi|Vj
= · · · =
〈p(nj)
Vi|Vj
,p
(nj−1)
Vi|Vj
〉
K2
Vi|Vj
, i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2, ...,M, (C.6)
where KVi|Vj , i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2, ...,M , is the same as in (C.5).
Introduce the following lemma, which is used to prove Lemma III.1:
Lemma C.1. Under Assumption III.1,
‖qyj ,Vi‖22 = K2Vi|Vj
[
(1− cos θVi|Vj)‖qyj ,Vj‖22 + cos θVi|Vj
]
, i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2, ...,M.(C.7)
Proof of Lemma C.1: Expression (C.3) can be re-written as
qyj ,Vi = q
(1)
yj ,Vj
p
(1)
Vi|Vj
+ q
(2)
yj ,Vj
p
(2)
Vi|Vj
+ ... + q
(nj)
yj ,Vj
p
(nj)
Vi|Vj
, i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2, ...,M, (C.8)
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where, as before, the pVi|Vj ’s, i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2, ...,M , are the columns of P [Vi|Vj], i 6=
j, i, j = 1, 2, ...,M . Using the above equation, compute ‖qyj ,Vi‖22, i 6= j, i, j =
1, 2, ...,M , as
‖qyj ,Vi‖22 = [q(1)yj ,Vj ]2‖p
(1)
Vi|Vj
‖22 + · · ·+ [q(nj)yj ,Vj ]2‖p
(nj)
Vi|Vj
‖22
+2q
(1)
yj ,Vj
q
(2)
yj ,Vj
〈p(1)
Vi|Vj
,p
(2)
Vi|Vj
〉
+ · · ·+ 2q(nj−1)yj ,Vj q
(nj)
yj ,Vj
〈p(nj−1)
Vi|Vj
,p
(nj)
Vi|Vj
〉, i 6= j.
(C.9)
Substitute (C.5) and (C.6) in the right hand side of (C.9) to get:
‖qyj ,Vi‖22 = K2Vi|Vj‖qyj ,Vj‖22
+K2Vi|Vj cos θVi|Vj [2q
(1)
yj ,Vj
q
(2)
yj ,Vj
+ · · ·+ 2q(nj−1)yj ,Vj q
(nj)
yj ,Vj
].
(C.10)
From the definition of qyj ,Vj , yj ∈ Yj , j = 1, 2, ...,M (see (C.2)), we know that q(1)yj ,Vj +
q
(2)
yj ,Vj
+ · · · + q(nj)yj ,Vj = 1, yj ∈ Yj , j = 1, 2, ...,M . Square both sides of this expression to
get
[q
(1)
yj ,Vj
]2 + · · ·+ [q(nj)yj ,Vj ]2 + 2q
(1)
yj ,Vj
q
(2)
yj ,Vj
+ · · ·+ 2q(nj−1)yj ,Vj q
(nj)
yj ,Vj
= 1, j = 1, 2, ...,M,
=⇒ ‖qyj ,Vj‖22 + 2q(1)yj ,Vjq
(2)
yj ,Vj
+ · · ·+ 2q(nj−1)yj ,Vj q
(nj)
yj ,Vj
= 1, j = 1, 2, ...,M.
(C.11)
Clearly, from the second row of (C.11), we have 2q(1)yj ,Vjq
(2)
yj ,Vj
+ · · · + 2q(nj−1)yj ,Vj q
(nj)
yj ,Vj
=
1 − ‖qyj ,Vj‖22, yj ∈ Yj , j = 1, 2, ...,M . Substitute this expression in the right hand side
of (C.10) to get ‖qyj ,Vi‖22 = K2Vi|Vj
[
(1− cos θVi|Vj)‖qyj ,Vj‖22 + cos θVi|Vj
]
, yj ∈ Yj, i 6=
j, i, j = 1, 2, ...,M . This completes the proof of this lemma. 
Proof of Lemma III.1: As assumed in the statement of the lemma, let the pmf’s qyj ,Vj ,
yj ∈ Yj , j = 1, 2, ...,M , have the same entropy, i.e.,
H2{qyj ,Vj} = c, yj ∈ Yj, j = 1, 2, ...,M, 0 ≤ c ≤ 1, (C.12)
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where, as before, the entropy is defined as
H2{qyj ,Vj} = − lognj(‖qyj ,Vj‖22), yj ∈ Yj, j = 1, 2, ...,M. (C.13)
The above equation can be re-written as
‖qyj ,Vj‖2 = n
− 1
2
H2{qyj,Vj }
j , yj ∈ Yj, j = 1, 2, ...,M. (C.14)
Further, taking into account (C.12), we have
‖qyj ,Vj‖2 = n−
c
2
j , yj ∈ Yj, j = 1, 2, ...,M, 0 ≤ c ≤ 1, (C.15)
which implies that the 2-norms of the pmf’s qyj ,Vj , yj ∈ Yj , j = 1, 2, ...,M , are also the
same.
As before, the inferred pmf’s qyj ,Vi , yj ∈ Yj , i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2, ...,M , are computed
using the above pmf’s qyj ,Vj , yj ∈ Yj , j = 1, 2, ...,M , and the total probability formula
(see (C.3)). As a result of Lemma C.1, the square of the 2-norm of qyj ,Vi , yj ∈ Yj , i 6= j,
i, j = 1, 2, ...,M , can be expressed as
‖qyj ,Vi‖22 = K2Vi|Vj
[
(1− cos θVi|Vj)n−cj + cos θVi|Vj
]
, yj ∈ Yj, i 6= j. (C.16)
Clearly, the right hand side of the above equation is a constant, and can be denoted as
dij := K
2
Vi|Vj
[
(1− cos θVi|Vj )n−cj + cos θVi|Vj
]
, i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2, ...,M. (C.17)
As in (C.13), the entropy of qyj ,Vi , yj ∈ Yj , i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2, ...,M , can be computed
as
H2{qyj ,Vi} = − logni(dij), yj ∈ Yj, i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2, ...,M, (C.18)
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where dij , i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2, ...,M , is defined in (C.17). Clearly, the entropies of the
inferred pmf’s are the same. This completes the proof of this lemma. 
C.2 Proof of Theorem III.1
As assumed in Section 3.2, the state y∗j ∈ Yj , j = 1, 2, ...,M , represents the state of
the sensor subnetwork SNj , j = 1, 2, ...,M , where the entropy of the pmf of Vj , j =
1, 2, ...,M , is minimized, i.e.,
H2{qy∗j ,Vj} < H2{qyj ,Vj}, yj 6= y∗j , yj ∈ Yj, j = 1, 2, ...,M. (C.19)
Due to the definition of the entropy (C.13), the above expression implies
‖qy∗j ,Vj‖2 > ‖qyj ,Vj‖2, yj 6= y∗j , yj ∈ Yj, j = 1, 2, ...,M. (C.20)
Based on Lemma C.1, the square of the 2-norm of the inferred pmf, qy∗j ,Vi , i 6= j,
i, j = 1, 2, ...,M , can be expressed as
‖qy∗j ,Vi‖22 = K2Vi|Vj
[
(1− cos θVi|Vj )‖qy∗j ,Vj‖22 + cos θVi|Vj
]
, i 6= j. (C.21)
Further, due to (C.20), the above equation can be re-written as the following inequality:
‖qy∗j ,Vi‖22 > K2Vi|Vj
[
(1− cos θVi|Vj)‖qyj ,Vj‖22 + cos θVi|Vj
]
, yj 6= y∗j , i 6= j. (C.22)
However, the right hand side of (C.22) equals ‖qyj ,Vi‖22, yj ∈ Yj , i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2, ...,M
(see Lemma C.1). Thus,
‖qy∗j ,Vi‖2 > ‖qyj ,Vi‖2, yj 6= y∗j , yj ∈ Yj, i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2, ...,M. (C.23)
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Due to the definition of the entropy (C.13), the above expression implies H2{qy∗j ,Vi} <
H2{qyj ,Vi}, yj 6= y∗j , yj ∈ Yj , i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2, ...,M . This completes the proof of this
theorem. 
C.3 Proof of Lemma III.2
Consider the pmf’s pˆyj [Vi], yj ∈ Yj , i, j = 1, 2, ...,M . It can be shown that the entropy of
these pmf’s takes values in
0 ≤ H2{pˆyj [Vi]} ≤ 1, yj ∈ Yj , i, j = 1, 2, ...,M, (C.24)
where the maximum value of H2{·} is attained at the uniform pmf,
punif[Vi] =
[
1
ni
,
1
ni
, · · · , 1
ni
]⊤
, i = 1, 2, ....,M, (C.25)
and the minimum value of H2{·} is attained at the pmf’s [1, 0, 0, ..., 0]⊤, [0, 1, 0, ..., 0]⊤, ...,
[0, 0, ..., 0, 1]⊤. Thus, we have
0 ≤ H2{pˆyj [Vi]} ≤ H2{punif[Vi]}, yj ∈ Yj, i, j = 1, 2, ...,M. (C.26)
Now, consider the following system of inequalities:
H2{pˆy1[Vi]} ≤ H2{pˆy1[Vi]},
H2{pˆy2[Vi]} ≤ H2{punif[Vi]},
H2{pˆy3[Vi]} ≤ H2{punif[Vi]},
.
.
.
H2{pˆyM [Vi]} ≤ H2{punif[Vi]},
(C.27)
where the first of these inequalities is trivially satisfied, while the remaining are due to
(C.26). As before, the pmf’s pˆy1 [Vi], pˆy2[Vi], ..., pˆyM [Vi], involved in the left hand side of
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(C.27), can be combined using the Dempster-Shafer rule (see (3.13)) to obtain the pmf
pˆ(y1,y2,...,yM)[Vi]. Further, it can be shown that the Dempster-Shafer combination of the
pmf’s pˆy1[Vi], punif[Vi], punif[Vi],..., punif[Vi], involved in the right hand side of (C.27), results
in the pmf pˆy1 [Vi]. Clearly, due to Assumption III.2, the above arguments imply
H2{pˆ(y1,y2,...,yM)[Vi]} ≤ H2{pˆy1 [Vi]}. (C.28)
Similarly, it can be shown that
H2{pˆ(y1,y2,...,yM)[Vi]} ≤ H2{pˆy2 [Vi]},
H2{pˆ(y1,y2,...,yM)[Vi]} ≤ H2{pˆy3 [Vi]},
.
.
.
H2{pˆ(y1,y2,...,yM)[Vi]} ≤ H2{pˆyM [Vi]}.
(C.29)
This completes the proof of this lemma. 
C.4 Proof of Theorem III.2
Recall that the centralized optimal state x∗i ∈ X , i = 1, 2, ...,M , is the unique minimizer of
the penalty function H2{pˆx[Vi]}, i = 1, 2, ...,M , x ∈ X (here x is viewed as the argument
of the penalty function). Regarding the decentralized optimal state (y∗1, y∗2, ..., y∗M) ∈ X ,
consider the following statements:
As assumed in Section 3.2, the pmf’s pˆy∗i [Vi], i = 1, 2, ...,M , satisfy the relation
H2{pˆy∗i [Vi]} ≤ H2{pˆyi[Vi]}, yi ∈ Yi, i = 1, 2, ...,M, (C.30)
where the equality is attained at yi = y∗i , i = 1, 2, ...,M . Further, as shown in Theorem
III.1, the pmf’s pˆy∗j [Vi], i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2, ...,M , satisfy the relation
H2{pˆy∗j [Vi]} ≤ H2{pˆyj [Vi]}, yj ∈ Yj, i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2, ...,M, (C.31)
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where, as before, the equality is attained at yj = y∗j , j 6= i, i, j = 1, 2, ...,M . Clearly, due
to Assumption III.2, the above inequalities imply
H2{pˆ(y∗1 ,y∗2 ,...,y∗M)[Vi]} ≤ H2{pˆ(y1,y2,...,yM)[Vi]}, yj ∈ Yj, i, j = 1, 2, ...,M. (C.32)
Equation (C.32) indicates that the penalty function H2{pˆx[Vi]}, i = 1, 2, ...,M , x ∈
X , is minimized at the decentralized optimal state (y∗1, y∗2, ..., y∗M) ∈ X . Furthermore,
due to the assumption of uniqueness of the solution of this minimization problem, the
decentralized optimal state must be the same as the centralized one, i.e.,
(y∗1, y
∗
2, ..., y
∗
M) = x
∗
i , i = 1, 2, ...,M. (C.33)
This completes the proof of this theorem. 
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APPENDIX D
Proofs of Lemmas and Theorem Stated in Chapter IV
D.1 Proof of Lemma IV.1
The selection of Usafe is based on the solution of the following system of inequalities:
Usafeαmin ≥ Vmin,
Usafeαmax ≤ Vmax.
(D.1)
In other words, we require Usafe to satisfy the relations Usafe ≥ Vminαmin and Usafe ≤ Vmaxαmax .
Clearly, a solution to the above system of inequalities exists due to Assumption (4.5), and,
therefore, the Usafe is selected as any number in
[
Vmin
αmin
, Vmax
αmax
]
. This completes the proof of
this lemma. 
D.2 Proof of Lemma IV.2
From the model (4.17), we know that
V˜ (0) = αactUsafe, (D.2)
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where, as before, αact is the actual gain of the process variable. Based on the above V˜ (0),
the actual status of the process variable at time n = 0, denoted as σact,0, can be computed
as
σact,0 =


LV , if V˜ (0) ∈ [Vmin, R1),
NV , if V˜ (0) ∈ [R1, R2),
HV , if V˜ (0) ∈ [R2, Vmax].
(D.3)
Thus, the pmf p[V (0)] is evaluated as
p[V (0) = σact,0] = 1,
p[V (0) = σ] = 0, σ 6= σact,0, σ ∈ {LV ,NV ,HV }.
(D.4)
Due to Assumption (4.19), we have S˜(0) = kaV˜ (0) + da. Substitute (D.2) in this
expression to get
S˜(0) = kaUsafeαact + da. (D.5)
Due to Assumption (4.21), the above equation implies
S˜(0) ∈ Iact
(
V˜ (0)
)
, (D.6)
where Iact is, as before, defined in (4.18). Clearly, the pmf p[S(0)] is:
p[S(0) = σact,0] = 1,
p[S(0) = σ] = 0, σ 6= σact,0, σ ∈ {LV ,NV ,HV }.
(D.7)
The pmf pˆ[V (0)] is evaluated using the steady state of the h-procedure, (2.20), as
pˆ[V (0) = σ] = DQp[S(0) = σ] +
1−DQ
3
, σ ∈ {LV ,NV ,HV }. (D.8)
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Using (D.7), the above expression can be re-written as
pˆ[V (0) = σact,0] =
1+2DQ
3
,
pˆ[V (0) = σ] = 1−DQ
3
, σ 6= σact,0, σ ∈ {LV ,NV ,HV }.
(D.9)
Clearly, since DQ takes values between 0 and 1, the above pmf takes the maximum proba-
bility in the status σact,0. This completes the proof of this lemma. 
D.3 Proof of Theorem IV.1
Select the inputs Uσ, σ ∈ {LV ,NV ,HV }, as
Uσ =
Vdes
ασ
, σ ∈ {LV ,NV ,HV }. (D.10)
Introduce the following lemma, which is used to prove Theorem IV.1:
Lemma D.1. The solution of the constrained minimization problem (4.14) is given by
∆
∗(1) =
∑
σ=LV ,NV ,HV
WσDσ[Vdes − Eσ]∑
σ=LV ,NV ,HV
WσD
2
σ
, (D.11)
where Dσ and Eσ are defined as
Dσ := ασ[Udes − Usafe], Eσ := ασUsafe, σ ∈ {LV ,NV ,HV }. (D.12)
Proof. The predicted value of the process variable can be expressed as
Vˆσ,Ures(1;∆(1)) = ∆(1)Dσ + Eσ, σ ∈ {LV ,NV ,HV }, (D.13)
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where Dσ and Eσ are the same as in (D.12). The constrained minimization problem (4.14)
can be re-written as
maximize
∆(1)
∑
σ=LV ,NV ,HV
−1
2
Wσ
[
Vˆσ,Ures(1;∆(1))− Vdes
]2
,
subject to Vmin ≤ Vˆσ,Ures(1;∆(1)) ≤ Vmax, σ ∈ {LV ,NV ,HV },
0 ≤ ∆(1) ≤ 1.
(D.14)
Substitute (D.13) in the above constrained maximization problem, and express its La-
grangian as
L = −1
2
∑
σ=LV ,NV ,HV
Wσ [Dσ∆(1) + Eσ − Vdes]2
+
∑
σ=LV ,NV ,HV
µ1,σ[Vmax −Dσ∆(1)− Eσ]
+
∑
σ=LV ,NV ,HV
µ2,σ[−Vmin +Dσ∆(1) + Eσ] + µ3[1−∆(1)] + µ4∆(1),
(D.15)
where µ1,σ, σ ∈ {LV ,NV ,HV }, µ2,σ, σ ∈ {LV ,NV ,HV }, µ3, and µ4 are the Lagrange mul-
tipliers. Apply the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions [70] to solve for the candidate
optima, ∆∗(1), µ∗1,σ, σ ∈ {LV ,NV ,HV }, µ∗2,σ, σ ∈ {LV ,NV ,HV }, µ∗3, and µ∗4:
−
∑
σ=LV ,NV ,HV
WσDσ [Dσ∆
∗(1) + Eσ − Vdes]−
∑
σ=LV ,NV ,HV
µ∗1,σDσ
+
∑
σ=LV ,NV ,HV
µ∗2,σDσ − µ∗3 + µ∗4 = 0,
µ∗1,σ[−Vmax +Dσ∆∗(1) + Eσ] = 0, σ ∈ {LV ,NV ,HV },
µ∗2,σ[Vmin −Dσ∆∗(1)− Eσ] = 0, σ ∈ {LV ,NV ,HV },
µ∗3[∆
∗(1)− 1] = 0, µ∗4∆∗(1) = 0,
µ∗1,σ ≥ 0, µ∗2,σ ≥ 0, σ ∈ {LV ,NV ,HV },
µ∗3 ≥ 0, µ∗4 ≥ 0.
(D.16)
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The solution of the above system of equations and inequalities is given by
∆
∗(1) =
∑
σ=LV ,NV ,HV
WσDσ[Vdes −Eσ]∑
σ=LV ,NV ,HV
WσD
2
σ
,
µ∗1,σ = µ
∗
2,σ = 0, σ ∈ {LV ,NV ,HV },
µ∗3 = µ
∗
4 = 0.
(D.17)
Clearly, the above ∆∗(1) satisfies the KKT conditions. Furthermore, it can be shown
that the constrained minimization problem (4.14) is convex. Thus, based on these argu-
ments, it can be concluded that the unique solution of (4.14) is, indeed, ∆∗(1). This com-
pletes the proof of this lemma. 
Proof of Theorem IV.1: Based on Lemma D.1, the input Ures at time n = 1 can be
computed as
Ures(1) = Vdes
∑
σ=LV ,NV ,HV
Wσασ∑
σ=LV ,NV ,HV
Wσα
2
σ
. (D.18)
Recall that the value of the process variable and the sensor measurement at time n = 1 are
V˜ (1) = αactUres(1), (D.19)
and
S˜(1) = kaαactUres(1) + da, (D.20)
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respectively, where Ures(1) is the same as in (D.18). Substitute (D.18) in the right hand side
of (D.20) to get
S˜(1) = kaαactVdes


∑
σ=LV ,NV ,HV
Wσασ∑
σ=LV ,NV ,HV
Wσα
2
σ

+ da. (D.21)
Using the definition of Wσ (see (4.15)), rewrite the above equation as
S˜(1) = kaαactVdes


∑
σ=LV ,NV ,HV
pˆ[V (0) = σ]ασ∑
σ=LV ,NV ,HV
pˆ[V (0) = σ]α2σ

+ da. (D.22)
Recall that pˆ[V (0)], involved in the right hand side of (D.22), is evaluated in (D.9). Thus,
re-express (D.22) as
S˜(1) = kaVdesαact
[
αLV +αNV +αHV +[3αact−αLV −αNV −αHV ]DQ(ka,da)
α2LV
+α2NV
+α2HV
+[3α2act−α
2
LV
−α2NV
−α2HV
]DQ(ka,da)
]
+ da. (D.23)
Clearly, due to Assumption (4.22), we have S˜(1) ∈ [R1, R2). Therefore, the pmf p[S(1)]
is:
p[S(1) = NV ] = 1,
p[S(1) = LV ] = p[S(1) = HV ] = 0.
(D.24)
Using (D.24), the pmf pˆ[V (1)] can be computed as before:
pˆ[V (1) = NV ] =
1+2DQ
3
,
pˆ[V (1) = LV ] = pˆ[V (1) = HV ] =
1−DQ
3
.
(D.25)
As it may be observed from (D.9) and (D.25), the pmf’s pˆ[V (0)] and pˆ[V (1)] are cor-
rectly permuted. This completes the proof of this theorem. 
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